

Xinxin Lyu

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EDUCATION

Purdue University

PhD candidate in Economics, Krannert School of Management, GPA: 3.84/4.0
Committee: Tim Cason (Co-chair), Yaroslav Rosokha (Co-chair), David Gill, Brian Roberson

West Lafayette, IN

August 2018 - present

Tufts University

Master of Science in Economics, GPA: 3.76/4

Medford, MA

September 2014 - May 2016

University of International Relations

Bachelor of Economics, Graduate with honor, GPA: 3.64/4.0

Beijing, China

September 2010 - July 2014

RESEARCH INTERESTS

Experimental Economics, Behavioral Economics, Applied Game Theory, Computational Economics, Public Economics, Applied Microeconomics, Agent-based Models, Social Learning, Networks

RESEARCH PAPERS

Publications

“Evolution of cooperation in the indefinitely repeated collective action with a contest for power”

(with Yaroslav Rosokha, Sergey Gavrilets, and Denis Tverskoi)

Accepted at Economic Theory

“Anger management: Aggression and punishment in the provision of public goods.” Games 8.1 (2017): 5.

(with Laura K. Gee, Xinxin Lyu, and Heather Urry.)

Working Papers

Job Market Paper: “Pay for the Privilege: Does the opportunity of a global club good crowd out local public good provision?”

R&R at Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

Abstract: This paper examines the effects of a global club good opportunity on local public good provision and overall welfare in an indefinitely repeated linear public good game setting with a voluntary contribution mechanism. Using human subject experiments, the study varies the entry cost and local community endowment composition to determine the impact of these factors on cooperation. Results indicate that when the entry cost is low, the majority of subjects join the global club, leading to improved total welfare. The presence of endowment heterogeneity does not significantly affect the impact of the global club opportunity. However, when the entry cost is high, fewer participants join the club, particularly in heterogeneous communities, resulting in decreased total welfare. In homogenous communities, those who join the club benefit from the opportunity, while in heterogeneous communities, participants ignore the opportunity and revert to cooperating in their local public good. In addition to the human subject experiment, I used counterfactual simulations based on individual evolutionary learning models to show that the global club good opportunity is only welfare-improving when it yields sufficiently large social benefits compared to the local public good.

“Effective social learning in a directed network”

“Cooperation under the Shadow of Political Inequality”

(with Yaroslav Rosokha, Sergey Gavrilets, and Denis Tverskoi)

R&R at Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control

Work in Progress

“Dynamics of beliefs, power, and inequality in within- and between-group cooperation and conflict”

(with Yaroslav Rosokha, Sergey Gavrilets, and Denis Tverskoi)

FELLOWSHIPS, HONORS & AWARDS

Daniels School of Business Doctoral Research Excellence Awards	2023-2024
Krannert Doctoral Student Research Fund Awards (\$3K, \$4K, \$4K)	2021,2022,2023
KDSA Research Symposium Best Presentation Award Winner	2020
Krannert Certificate for Outstanding Teaching for Econ 251	Summer 2021, Summer 2020, Summer 2022

PRESENTATIONS

2023 Eastern Economic Association Annual Meetings, New York City, NY; Ostrom-Smith mini-conference in behavioral and experimental economics, Bloomington, IN; North-American ESA Conference, Charlotte, NC; Annual Meeting of the Southern Economic Association, New Orleans, LA

2022 Missouri Valley Economic Association Annual Conference, St. Louis, MO; North-American ESA Conference, Santa Barbara, CA

2021 Ostrom-Smith mini-conference in behavioral and experimental economics, West Lafayette, IN; North-American ESA Conference, Tucson, AZ; Networks (virtual)

2020 & 2019 KDSA Research Symposium, West Lafayette, IN

2016 North-American ESA Conference, Tucson, AZ

TEACHING & RESEARCH EXPERIENCE

Instructors

Online Instructor: Microeconomics (Econ 251)	Summer 2022, 2021, 2020
Recitation Instructor: Principles of Economics (Econ 210)	Spring 2019, Fall 2018

Teaching Assistants

Behavioral Economics (Econ 585) – Masters level	Spring 2022
Agent-based Computational Economics (Econ 641) – Ph.D. level	Fall 2022
Quantitative Economics (Econ 590) – Masters level	Fall 2022, Spring 2022
Computational Economics (Econ 390) – Undergraduate level	Fall2022, Fall 2021
Macro Theory II (Econ 611)– Ph.D. level	Spring 2021, Spring 2020
Intermediate Macroeconomics (Econ 352)– Undergraduate level	Spring 2021, Fall 2020, Spring 2020, Fall 2019
Macroeconomics (Econ 252)– Undergraduate level	Fall 2021
Micro Theory III (Econ 609) – Ph.D. level	Spring 2020
Advanced Game Theory (Econ 610) – Ph.D. level	Spring 2020
Game Theory (Econ 451) - Undergraduate Level	Fall 2019
Micro Theory I (Econ 606) – Ph.D. level	Fall 2019
Money and Banking (Econ 380) – Undergraduate level	Fall 2018, Spring 2019
Managerial Economics (Econ 301) – Undergraduate level	Fall 2018, Spring 2019

Research Assistants

Tim Cason Otree programming	Fall 2021 - Present
Yaroslav Rosokha Otree programming, Lab management	Fall 2021 - Present
Cathy Zhang Proof reading, Data analysis in Stata	Fall 2019 & 2020, Spring 2020
Kyle Emerick Proof reading & Robustness check, Data analysis in Stata	Summer 2015 - Summer 2016
Laura Gee Robustness check, Data analysis in Stata, Lab Management	Spring 2016

REFERENCES

Tim Cason
Professor of Economics
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Yaroslav Rosokha
Associate Professor of Economics
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David Gill
Professor of Economics
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