

## Day 30: The Tacit Quarterly Information Event in the Banking Industry

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September 2015

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**Abstract:** We investigate the timing of bank regulatory report releases and their role in banks' information environments. Each quarter commercial banks and bank holding companies file detailed financial reports called Call Reports and FR Y-9Cs with bank regulators. We find that Call Reports, but not FR Y-9Cs, elicit economically significant stock price and volume reactions when they are publicly released, even when the Call Report follows an earnings announcement. Our results also indicate that the release of the Call Reports is tightly clustered around the 30th day after quarter end, a fact not widely known because a record of the public release dates of these regulatory reports is unavailable. We show that since bank regulators undertook a "modernization project" to speed the processing and public dissemination of regulatory reports, the banking industry routinely experiences abnormal stock price volatility and trading volume on the 30<sup>th</sup> day of the quarter. Finally, we identify conditions under which researchers can use market reaction on day 30 to approximate market reaction on actual Call Report release dates. Overall, our findings indicate that equity investors derive incremental information from regulatory filings, and they highlight a market-moving information event about banks that occurs in a tight window around the 30th day of the quarter.

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**Keywords:** Call Report, FR Y-9C, commercial banks, bank holding company, earnings announcement, 10-K, 10-Q, market reaction, banking industry

**JEL classification:** M41, M42, M44

**Data Availability:** Data are available from sources identified in the paper including SNL Financial, a financial services data provider.

We appreciate helpful comments from Anwer Ahmed, Ramji Balakrishnan, Ray Ball, Erik Beardsley, Ciao-Wei Chen, Brant Christensen, Dan Collins, John Gallempore, Jon Garfinkel, Pingyang Gao, Joseph Gerakos, Joao Granja, Paul Hribar, Anya Kleymenova, Sam Melessa, Rick Mergenthaler, Mark Penno, John Pogach, Korok Ray, Pat Relich, Sarah Rice, Steven Savoy, Doug Skinner, Ed Swanson, Senyo Tse, Connie Weaver, Jaron Wilde, and workshop participants at the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Texas A&M University, the University of Chicago Booth, and the University of Iowa. We thank Manisha Goswami, Lorie Marsh, and Bill McDonald for research assistance, and John Montgomery at SNL Financial for assistance with obtaining data. We are grateful for financial support from the Center for Accounting Research and Education (CARE) at the Mendoza College of Business, the Deloitte Foundation, PricewaterhouseCoopers, and the Mendoza College of Business.

## I. INTRODUCTION

Each quarter commercial banks and bank holding companies (BHCs) file detailed financial reports called Call Reports and FR Y-9Cs with bank regulators. The reports are publicly accessible on regulatory websites or through subscription data providers such as SNL Financial, and are released in the same general time frame as earnings announcements and 10-K or 10-Q filings. Call Reports present information at the individual bank level, and thus are filed by each individual bank within a BHC or by independent banks (that are not part of BHCs). Y-9Cs present information consolidated at the BHC level, and are thus filed only by BHCs. The two types of reports have similar organization and reportable items.

The information in the reports includes an income statement and balance sheet, and considerably overlaps with the information in 10-K/Q forms.<sup>1</sup> Compared to 10-K/Qs, the bank regulatory reports tend to contain finer subcategories of financial statement items and additional details about mortgage lending activities, regulatory capital, and credit risk, all presented in standardized schedules. Unlike 10-K/Qs, the regulatory reports contain almost no qualitative disclosures. The release process occurs outside of channels designed by Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The reports do not appear on the SEC's EDGAR platform used to distribute financial reports such as earnings announcements and 10-Ks, and banks rarely file SEC form 8-Ks to announce the report releases.

In this study, we investigate the timing of the regulatory report releases and their role in banks' information environments. A historical record of the public release dates is not publicly available, and our Freedom of Information Act request for the release dates was denied. We instead

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<sup>1</sup> The recognition and measurement practices followed in creating the regulatory reports conform to U.S. GAAP, although the reports provide information that goes beyond what is required by U.S. GAAP. Because Call Reports are bank-level reports, each bank (along with its consolidated subsidiaries) is considered an accounting entity (FDIC 2012, 11).

obtained release dates by tracking the release of each report in real time from January 1, 2012 to March 31, 2014 through SNL Financial, which scans the regulatory reporting websites multiple times per day and provided us with a daily listing of the reports that had become available for download.<sup>2</sup>

During this period, we find that most Call Reports become public on their due date, which for nearly all banks is the 30<sup>th</sup> calendar day following quarter end or the next business day if the 30<sup>th</sup> calendar day falls on a weekend or holiday.<sup>3</sup> Approximately 92 percent of Call Reports are released in the five trading days around the 30<sup>th</sup> calendar day, beginning on day 27 and ending on day 31. Days 29 and 30 are the peak days, with 17 percent released on day 29 and 56 percent released on day 30. Releases of Y-9Cs cluster around their due date as well, which is the 40<sup>th</sup> day following interim quarter ends and the 45<sup>th</sup> day following the fourth quarter end. Peak times for Y-9C releases are days 36 to 44 following interim quarters and days 40 to 49 following the fourth quarter. Based on public statements by regulators and our own empirical analysis (described later), we estimate that the regulatory reports began exhibiting these timing patterns in late 2005 or 2006.

The regulatory reports are released in the same general time frame as earnings announcements and 10-K/Q filings, giving rise to questions about their role in banks' information environments. We examine whether BHC stock prices respond to the release of the reports, whether the response depends on the timing of the reports relative to earnings announcements, and whether the response to earnings announcements is lower when they follow the regulatory reports. Additionally, we examine whether the reaction to the regulatory reports varies with bank characteristics, such as size and risk, which are hypothesized to make the reports more or less

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<sup>2</sup> Gathering these dates in real time was necessary because SNL Financial overwrites its record of original release dates when the bank amends a filing.

<sup>3</sup> For ease of exposition, we refer to "day 30" as the 30<sup>th</sup> calendar day following quarter end, or as the next business day if the 30<sup>th</sup> calendar day falls on a weekend or holiday.

informative to investors.

We find that Call Reports elicit statistically and economically significant stock price and volume reactions when they are publicly released. The market reaction is significant even when the Call Report follows an earnings announcement (which is the most common scenario). To proxy for price reaction we compute a measure of price volatility that sums the squared market-adjusted returns on the report release day and the following day (event days 0 and +1). Our abnormal volume metric is also measured over the same two-day window. When the Call Report follows (precedes) the earnings announcement, mean price volatility around the report release date is 22 (17) percent higher than the non-event day mean. Although both means are statistically significantly greater than the non-event day mean, they do not statistically differ from each other. In contrast, price volatility around earnings announcements statistically differs according to whether the earnings announcement follows or precedes the Call Report; mean price volatility around earnings announcements that follow (precede) Call Reports is 118 (199) percent higher than the non-event day mean. Thus, when one report arrives before the other, Call Reports tend to preempt information in earnings announcements, but evidence is inconclusive about whether earnings announcements preempt information in Call Reports. We find no statistically significant price or volume reaction to releases of Y-9C reports. The most plausible explanation is that Y-9Cs are released late in the reporting season, after their information content has been preempted by Call Reports, earnings announcements, and sometimes 10-K/Qs.

Sensitivity tests provide more evidence that Call Report releases are the cause of the abnormal market activity. We detect abnormal market activity on day 30 only among the banks whose Call Reports are released on day 30, not among banks whose Call Reports are released at other times. Furthermore, we detect no abnormal market activity on the days just prior to day 30,

except among the banks whose Call Reports are released on those days. Finally, our results are quantitatively similar after controlling for concurrent events.

We next investigate whether the market reaction to Call Reports varies with bank characteristics. We focus on Call Reports released after earnings announcements because this is the most common sequence and results may speak to why investors find the Call Report useful after they have seen the earnings announcement. We find that the price reaction to Call Reports decreases in bank size, consistent with large banks having stronger information environments that make Call Reports less relevant. There is also some evidence that market reaction to Call Reports increases in bank risk, as measured by low capital ratios and asset/liability maturity gaps, and decreases with the incurrence of losses and changes in loan losses.

Given that the exact dates of Call Report releases are not available outside of our hand-collected sample period, we assess how well the market reaction to Call Report releases can be approximated by assuming that all Call Reports are released on day 30 (or on the next business day if day 30 falls on weekends or holidays). When pooling all day 30 observations regardless of whether they are before or after earnings announcements, we find that the market reaction results based on the assumed “day 30” release dates are similar to those based on actual release dates. “Assumed-date” results are also similar to “actual-date” results within the partition of banks where day 30 follows the earnings announcement. In contrast, “assumed-date” results are considerably weaker than “actual-date” results within the partition of banks where day 30 precedes the earnings announcement. Thus, results using assumed day 30 release dates are similar to those using actual release dates, provided that earnings are announced before day 30.

In late 2005, bank regulators completed a “modernization project” to speed the processing and public dissemination of regulatory reports (Gruenberg 2006; FFIEC 2006, 5). We find a pattern

of market responses to Call Reports that is consistent with the timing of the modernization project. Using assumed day 30 release dates, we extend the sample period back to the year 2000 and partition by year to determine when day 30 became a market-moving event day in the banking industry. We find that five of the eight years between 2006 and 2013 exhibit statistically higher price volatility and/or trading volume around day 30. In contrast, none of the six years between 2000 and 2005 exhibit statistically higher price volatility or trading volume around day 30.

The findings have several implications for practice and regulation. First, the findings increase awareness that a flood of market-moving information about banks is routinely released in a tight window around the 30<sup>th</sup> day of every quarter, a fact that has not been well publicized nor empirically examined. For some banks this information release precedes and preempts the earnings announcement, which is a highly unusual way for public company earnings information to be unveiled. Typically public companies give prior notice of the date and time of the earnings announcement so that investors can prepare for it.<sup>4</sup> In contrast, no prior notice of the date and time of a Call Report release is available. Furthermore, the release itself typically is not accompanied by a public alert such as an 8-K, thus providing a timing advantage to investors who subscribe to alerts from private data vendors or who conduct their own scraping of regulatory websites.

Second, the finding that bank stock prices respond to information that is required by bank regulators provides evidence supporting the proposition that bank regulators can use equity market values as signals in their supervisory processes (Furlong and Williams 2006; Curry, Fissel, and Hanweck 2003). Third, the findings are suggestive of a positive externality related to the costly regulatory reporting process; even after earnings are released, investors react to Call Report

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<sup>4</sup> Regulation FD requires advanced notice of earnings conference calls (SEC 2000). Although no advanced notice of earnings press releases is technically required, in practice the vast majority of public companies issue prior notices of earnings press releases because conference calls are typically conducted in conjunction with the press release. Even before Regulation FD, it was common practice for firms to give prior notice of earnings releases.

releases. The reaction suggests that the reports have immediate incremental information content, unlike 10-K and 10-Q filings which tend not to elicit immediate market reaction (as found in this and other studies discussed later).

The implications of our findings for academic research are as follows. It appears that researchers can conduct studies involving market reactions to bank regulatory filings despite not knowing the exact release dates. Our timing analysis shows that day 30 is an accurate assumption for 56 percent of Call Report releases, and an event window spanning days 27 to 31 captures 92 percent of releases. Furthermore, within our sample period, when blindly applying the day 30 assumption, mean price volatility and volume are similar to those observed using the actual Call Report release dates (provided that earnings announcements have already occurred). We also find that Y-9C filings are less clustered in time compared to Call Reports and elicit no statistically significant market reaction. Thus, for studies involving market valuation of regulatory reporting items, the most powerful designs likely are achieved by focusing on Call Report filings around day 30 rather than on the less clustered and less timely Y-9C filings. Finally, the results are relevant to market studies that do not directly focus on bank regulatory reporting. In market studies involving samples that include banks, research designs should take into account banks' abnormal market activity around day 30 and the potential preemption of earnings announcements or other disclosures that follow day 30.

## **II. MOTIVATION AND BACKGROUND**

The banking industry plays a crucial role in the economy through financial intermediation between capital providers (e.g. depositors) and borrowers. Bank equity serves as a buffer to shield capital providers, or government insurers of capital providers, from losses. The market valuation of this buffer may serve as a useful supervisory signal to regulators because it aggregates market participants' judgments about bank risk (Furlong and Williams 2006; Curry et al. 2003). Although

the interests of equity holders do not perfectly align with those of bank regulators, Furlong and Williams (2006, 20) conclude that stock prices signal relevant aspects of risk to regulators, and point out that it may be more practical for regulators to rely on stock prices than debt prices because stocks tend to trade in more liquid markets. Recently, the Federal Reserve Board (FRB) stated that “a review of market indicators in the lead up to the recent financial crisis reveals that market-based data often provided an early signal of deterioration in a company’s financial condition” (FRB 2012, 640). Moreover, to implement Section 166(c)(1) of the Dodd-Frank Act, the FRB proposes using several equity- and debt-based market indicators, including a version of the market-to-book ratio, as “remediation triggers” for heightened supervisory review as soon as numeric thresholds are breached. The effectiveness of these market-based indicators depends, in part, on the ability of market values to promptly impound information from regulatory reports.

Understanding the use of bank regulatory reports in equity markets is also important because of the costs of preparing and distributing the reports. An interagency body called the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) expends public resources to maintain the report distribution website and to validate and publicly release each report as fast as within one day of receipt (FFIEC 2006, 6). The costs associated with such rapid turnaround may not be justified if investors derive little immediate informational value from the reports. The reporting process is also costly for bank preparers. Frequent mergers and acquisitions in the banking industry make it difficult and costly to integrate reporting systems. Moreover, some report items require manual data capture methods (American Bankers Association et al. 2011). A better understanding of the externalities associated with public dissemination of the reports may help regulators in setting reporting requirements.

Finally, the study contributes to the academic literature on market reaction to routine



financial disclosures. A long line of studies finds that SEC 10-K/Q forms have little information content incremental to earnings announcements, despite containing the complete set of financial statements, footnotes, and a host of other disclosures. Studies of the period prior to electronic filing on the SEC's EDGAR website generally find no market reaction around 10-K/Q filing dates. Easton and Zmijewski (1993) conduct the largest-sample study of the pre-EDGAR period and find a statistically significant market reaction only when the 10-K/Q is the only release of financial results for the period.<sup>5</sup> In these cases, the 10-K/Q is the de facto earnings release.

A similar pattern has persisted during the period of electronic filing on EDGAR. While some studies of the EDGAR period find a statistically significant market reaction on 10-K/10-Q filing dates (Asthana and Balsam 2002; Griffin 2003; You and Zhang 2009), Li and Ramesh (2009) point out that the studies do not consider the role of concurrent news about earnings. After eliminating cases when the 10-K/Qs serve as the de facto earnings release, or when an earnings announcement is concurrently issued with a 10-K/Q, Li and Ramesh (2009) find no reliable reaction to 10-Qs and find that reaction to 10-Ks is concentrated in the relatively small number of 10-Ks filed around calendar quarter ends. The authors attribute the quarter-end reaction to increased market attention and information transfer across firms at calendar quarter ends. Our study examines whether the market reacts to a financial report that is similar to the 10-K/Q except that it has a standardized format, has more detailed quantitative disclosures, and has considerably fewer qualitative disclosures. Thus, the study improves understanding of circumstances under which financial information beyond that provided in earnings announcements has information content.

## **Institutional Background**

Federally supervised commercial banks and BHCs must file financial statement-based

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<sup>5</sup> Other studies of the pre-EDGAR period include Foster and Vickrey (1978), Foster, Jenkins, and Vickrey (1983), Cready and Mynatt (1991), and Stice (1991). In general, these studies find little market reaction to 10-K filings.

reports with federal regulators each quarter. The two most extensive reports are the Call Report and the Y-9C, each containing over 2,000 reportable items and exceeding 50 pages.<sup>6</sup> Y-9Cs are filed by BHCs and Call Reports are filed by each individual bank within a BHC or by banks that are not part of BHCs.<sup>7</sup>

The reportable items for the Call Report are set by the FFIEC, an interagency body that primarily consists of high-ranking representatives from the Federal Reserve Board, FDIC, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and National Credit Union Administration. Reportable items for Y-9Cs are set by the Federal Reserve Board because it is the designated regulator of bank holding companies, but in practice the Call Report and Y-9C contain a similar set of reportable items which are usually reported on nearly identical schedules. Both reports include an income statement and balance sheet based on U.S. generally accepted accounting principles, along with many supporting schedules that usually present sub-classifications of particular income statement or balance sheet elements. The next section details differences between bank regulatory reports and 10-K/Qs.

Call Reports must be submitted and must have passed all of the FFIEC's validity checks within 30 days after quarter end, or 35 days for banks that have more than one foreign office (FDIC 2013, 7). Bank regulators state that "a few larger banks with foreign offices" qualify for the 35-day deadline (FRB et al. 2007). Y-9Cs must be submitted to the Federal Reserve Board within 40 days after interim quarter ends, unless that day falls on a weekend or holiday, and within 45 days after the quarter ending December 31. Based on communications with FDIC staff, the reports are typically publicly available on the FFIEC website within 24 hours of receipt.

Regulatory agencies do not make public a record of the original submission or release dates.

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<sup>6</sup> The official form name of the Call Report is "FFIEC 031" for banks with domestic and foreign offices and "FFIEC 041" for banks with domestic offices only.

<sup>7</sup> Bank holding companies with total consolidated assets of less than \$500 million generally are not required to file Y-9Cs.

The fields on the two report types that denote the date and time of submission are designated as confidential and are withheld from the public.<sup>8</sup> For both report types, a “last update” date is publicly observable on the front page the reports. However, this date is overwritten whenever the report is amended, and amendments are made frequently. In our sample, 36.7 percent of the reports are amended within the first 3 months, and our review in 2014 of ten Call Reports and ten Y-9Cs filed in 2008 and 2009 found that six (ten) Call Reports (Y-9Cs) had “last update” dates after the legal filing deadline, indicating that the original date had been overwritten. Consequently, studies that seek to examine the market reaction to the original filing of these reports should not rely upon the report date on the front page of the reports.

Banks expend significant resources on regulatory reporting, incremental to the resources expended in GAAP reporting, as illustrated by the following comment letter excerpt from bank industry lobby groups:

“In anticipation of meeting the LBP [Large Bank Pricing] rule’s requirements for fourth quarter 2011 (and beyond), LBP banks have and continue to work hard to develop systems and to educate personnel to capture the data required. In doing so, it has become clear that there continue to be real practical barriers to capturing and reporting data consistently, even prospectively. The banks have found that automated solutions are not available and cannot be easily created to capture information. As a consequence, they have had to look to manual methods for data capture, which is very costly and time consuming, and involves considerable training for thousands of employees” (ABA et al. 2011, 2).

Regulators themselves also expend resources in validating the reports and posting online. Between the banks and the regulators, the reports are checked against approximately 2,000 validation criteria (Gruenberg 2006). Investment in a “modernization” project in 2005 allowed regulators to begin taking delivery of the reports on the day after quarter end (compared to weeks after) and allowed the reports to be publicly released within a day of receipt (compared to several days after) (FFIEC

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<sup>8</sup> The Call Report fields are RSSD8798 and RSSD8799. The Y-9C fields are BHCKF841 and BHCKF842.

2006, 6).

### **Differences between Bank Regulatory Reports and 10-K/Qs**

There is much redundancy across bank regulatory reports and 10-K/Qs. We compared the bank regulatory reports to a 10-K/Q of five banks of varying sizes, and noted four major areas where the bank regulatory reports tended to provide more information than did the 10-K/Qs. First, the bank regulatory reports provide a more detailed breakdown of trading assets and liabilities by type (schedule RC-D on the Call Report and schedule HC-D on the Y-9C). This schedule must be completed by banks with greater than \$2 million of trading assets in any of the prior four quarters. The breakdown includes Treasury securities, government agency securities, five types of mortgage-backed securities, and other debt securities, as well as short positions broken down by equity, debt, and other securities.

Second, the bank regulatory reports contain a schedule of the dollar volume of residential mortgages originated, purchased, and sold during the quarter, along with repurchases, indemnifications, and warranty reserves for sold loans (schedule RC-P on the Call Report and schedule HC-P on the Y-9C). The schedule must be completed by banks with \$1 billion or more in total assets or banks with greater than \$10 million in residential mortgage lending activity for two consecutive quarters. The mortgages are classified into closed-end first liens, closed-end junior liens, and open-end loans extended under lines of credit. 10-K/Qs often contain no comparable schedule and less detailed information about residential mortgage lending.

Third, the bank regulatory reports contain a schedule showing, for each major asset category, the portion of the asset that is classified into each of four risk-weight categories (schedule RC-R on the Call Report and schedule HC-R on the Y-9C). The same is presented for derivatives and off-balance-sheet items such as letters of credit and loan commitments. The risk-weightings are

used to compute total risk-weighted assets, which serves as the denominator of the Tier 1 and Tier 2 risk-based capital ratios. The schedule allows investors to understand the risk composition of each asset or exposure. The schedule also lists the notional amounts of derivative contracts by type (interest rate, foreign exchange, gold, etc.) and by maturity (one year or less, two to five years, and over five years). Comparable information is not consistently included in 10-K/Qs.

Fourth, the bank regulatory reports contain a schedule showing securitization and asset sale activities by loan type (schedule RC-S on the Call Report and schedule HC-S on the Y-9C). Loan types include residential mortgage, home equity, credit card, auto, and commercial. Several features of the securitizations are reported, including the balance of assets sold and securitized with servicing retained or with recourse, the maximum amount of credit exposure arising from the recourse, unused commitments to provide liquidity to the securitizations, and past due loan amounts, charge-offs, and recoveries related to the securitizations. This information is more detailed and structured than what is typically found in 10-K/Qs.

Bank regulatory reports do lack some information that is found in 10-K/Qs. Major items that are contained in 10-K/Qs but are not found in the regulatory reports include: the Statement of Cash Flows, footnotes to the financial statements, shares outstanding and per share information, financial information for non-bank segments, and qualitative disclosures such as Management's Discussion and Analysis of Results, the Item 1 Business section, the auditor report, governance information, and internal control deficiencies. In summary, there is substantial overlap across bank regulatory reports and 10-K/Qs, but each type of report contains some unique information.

### **III. SAMPLE SELECTION AND PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS**

#### **Sample Selection**

We restrict the sample to publicly traded BHCs that file a Y-9C report and also own a

commercial bank that files a Call Report, excluding eight publicly traded commercial banks that are not held by BHCs. In order to link the BHCs to commercial banks, we use the Summary of Deposits file from the FDIC website. We identify the public release dates of the Call Reports and Y-9Cs from January 1, 2012 to March 31, 2014 by downloading on a daily basis the reports available in the SNL financial institutions database.<sup>9</sup> This allows us to track when a regulatory report was initially filed and subsequently amended.<sup>10</sup> When a quarter ends, we track the release date and subsequent amendments of reports in real time over the next three months. For example, for the fourth quarter ended December 31, 2011 we tracked the release and amendment dates of all fourth-quarter Call Reports and Y-9Cs filed from January 1, 2012 to March 31, 2012.

We obtain earnings announcement and 10-K/Q filing dates from Compustat and stock market return, volume, and shares outstanding data from CRSP. All other data items come from Federal Reserve Y-9C reports unless stated otherwise. To avoid potential confounding in our market reaction tests caused by a bank concurrently releasing two or more types of filings, we remove a BHC's day  $t$  from the sample if two or more filings occur on days  $t-1$  to  $t+1$ . Our final sample used in the market reaction tests consists of 164,821 BHC-day observations across 319 BHCs.

If a BHC is a multibank holding company (i.e. owns multiple commercial banks), it will be affiliated with multiple Call Reports in a given quarter and may stagger the issuance dates of those Call Reports. However, only 12 percent of the BHCs in our sample are multibank holding companies, and 49 percent of the time these multibank holding companies issue all of their Call

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<sup>9</sup> SNL financial also collects, standardizes, and disseminates all relevant corporate, financial, market and M&A data for the banking, financial services, insurance, real estate, energy, and metals & mining industries.

<sup>10</sup> Any report released on a U.S. holiday or a weekend is adjusted to the next trading day. In addition, during the sample period the U.S stock market was closed due to Hurricane Sandy on October 29<sup>th</sup> and 30<sup>th</sup> of 2012 and therefore we assign October 31<sup>st</sup> as the regulatory filing date.

Reports on the same day. On average, the Call Reports filed by a multibank holding company on its first filing day of the quarter reveal 62 percent of the holding company's total assets (the median percentage of assets revealed is 85 percent). Given that there are relatively few BHCs with staggered Call Reports and that a large portion of their assets tend to be reported on the day in which the first Call Report is released, we make the design choice in all analyses to include only the first Call Report filing day for a given BHC in each quarter.

### Market Reaction Metrics

We measure market reaction in short windows around the report release dates using a price and a volume metric. The price volatility metric is computed as follows:

$$RET_{it} = \frac{\sum_{t=0}^1 [R_{it} - R_{Mt}]^2}{E(\sum_{t=0}^1 [R_{it} - R_{Mt}]^2)} \quad (1)$$

where  $R_{it}$  ( $R_{Mt}$ ) is bank  $i$ 's (CRSP value weighted index) stock return on day  $t$ . The numerator is the cumulative squared market-adjusted return over days  $t$  and  $t+1$ . The denominator is the mean of this quantity measured during the last month of the previous quarter, which controls for the bank's normal level of price volatility near the event dates. We use the last month of the previous quarter as a baseline for a bank's price volatility because this month tends not to have filing events. Using squared returns eliminates the need to specify an expectations model for the direction in which the market will respond to a filing. We include the squared return on day  $t+1$  to accommodate reports that are filed after market hours, and to allow time for market participants to process the information in the filings.

Following Garfinkel and Sokobin (2006), the volume metric is computed as follows:

$$VOL_{it} = \sum_{t=0}^1 \left[ \frac{V_{it}}{Shs_{it}} - \frac{V_{Mt}}{Shs_{Mt}} \right] / 2 - E \left( \sum_{t=0}^1 \left[ \frac{V_{it}}{Shs_{it}} - \frac{V_{Mt}}{Shs_{Mt}} \right] / 2 \right) \quad (2)$$

where  $V_{it}$  ( $V_{Mt}$ ) is bank  $i$ 's (CRSP universe) trading volume on day  $t$ , and  $Shs_{it}$  ( $Shs_{Mt}$ ) is bank  $i$ 's

(CRSP universe) shares outstanding on day  $t$ . The first part of the metric sums bank  $i$ 's share turnover ( $V_{it} / Sh_{sit}$ ) over days  $t$  and  $t+1$ , and adjusts the bank's share turnover for the share turnover of the market on those same days. The second part of the metric adjusts this market-adjusted turnover metric for the bank's average level of market-adjusted turnover during the last month of the previous quarter. Subtracting the second part helps control for liquidity driven trading that is unrelated to the information events (Garfinkel and Sokobin 2006). We subtract the second part of the metric from the first part, rather than divide, because each part can have negative values. The VOL (RET) metric is sensitive to cases when there is disagreement (consensus) among investors about how the information in a filing affects firm value (Beaver 1968). While we expect results to be similar across the two metrics, we use both metrics in case reaction to bank regulatory filings tends to be dominated by either disagreement or consensus.

### **Timing of the Reports and Preliminary Test of Market Reaction**

Figure 1, Panel A, shows timing patterns for releases of the four types of reports: earnings announcements, Call Reports, Y-9Cs, and 10-K/Qs. The figure plots the percentage of reports released each day, by report type, over the 62 trading days following quarter end. We designate the 30<sup>th</sup> calendar day as day 0 in the figure in order to more clearly display the clustering of Call Reports that occurs around the 30<sup>th</sup> calendar day following quarter end.<sup>11</sup> Thus, other days in the figure represent the number of *trading days* before or after the 30<sup>th</sup> calendar day.<sup>12</sup>

[Insert Figure 1 here]

The figure shows that releases of Call Reports tightly cluster around the 30<sup>th</sup> calendar day,

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<sup>11</sup> In our sample period, the 30<sup>th</sup> calendar day always falls on a trading day. Had it not done so in a particular quarter, we would have designated the next trading day as day 0 for that quarter.

<sup>12</sup> Figure 1 should not be used as an indication of the degree of clustering of Y-9C reports because fourth-quarter Y-9Cs have a different due-date than interim quarter Y-9Cs; we address this issue next.



with 91.6 percent of Call Reports arriving between days -3 and +1. The peak days are -1 and 0, with 17.3 percent arriving on day -1 and 56.3 percent arriving on day 0. Earnings announcement activity begins before the Call Report activity, starting around day -12, peaking at day -4, and substantially finishing by day +12. Y-9Cs are released later in the reporting season, beginning around day +4.

On the figure we overlay a plot of the mean price volatility metric (RET) by day across banks (see the topmost plot and the secondary vertical axis). To isolate the price volatility related to bank regulatory reports, we remove the price volatility related to earnings announcements by excluding from the daily means the five trading days around each bank's earnings announcement, spanning one day before to three days after. Untabulated analysis shows that the sample banks have elevated RET over this five-day window. The figure shows a clear spike in mean RET at day 0, coinciding with the spike in Call Report releases. The plot hovers around a mean RET of 1.2 prior to day 0, spikes to 1.7 at day 0, and then sharply declines over the next three days. There are no other observable spikes in RET that coincide with peak times for Y-9C or 10-K/Q releases. Patterns in the plot of mean VOL are more ambiguous (not shown).

Figure 1, Panels B and C show the same plots for fourth-quarter versus interim reports. Both panels continue to show that price volatility peaks with the release of the Call Reports on day 0. Fourth-quarter Call Reports are more clustered than interim Call Reports. Days -1 and 0 contain 18.5 percent and 64.3 percent of fourth quarter Call Reports, compared to 16.7 percent and 52.3 percent for interim Call Reports. Fourth quarter Call Reports are rarely released after day 0; day +1 contains only 1.4 percent of fourth quarter Call Reports, compared to 9.9 percent of interim Call Reports. Both panels continue to show that Y-9C releases generally do not begin until after earnings announcements and Call Report releases end. Releases of fourth-quarter Y-9Cs tend to precede 10-

K filings. Interim Y-9Cs are released in roughly the same time frame as 10-Qs.<sup>13</sup> To summarize the sequencing of the reports, earnings announcements usually arrive first and Call Reports usually arrive second, although in a minority of cases Call Reports arrive first. Y-9Cs and 10-K/Qs arrive later.

Figure 2 shows disclosure timelines for three particular BHCs following the fourth quarter ended December 31, 2013. Panel A shows that the first disclosure for BBCN Bancorp is the earnings announcement, which is issued 27 days after the fourth quarter end. Three days later the Call Report is released, followed by the Y9C and then the 10-K. The reporting sequence of earnings announcement, then Call Report, then Y-9C, and then 10K/Q is the most common sequence in the sample. Panel B shows that JPMorgan Chase exhibits the same sequence as in Panel A, but files four Call Reports. The first three Call Reports are released on the same day (day 31) while the last Call Report is released five days later. Only 13 percent of BHCs need to file more than one Call Report.

Finally, Panel C provides an example of a bank that files its Call Report before the earnings announcement. Old National Bancorp's Call Report is released 29 days after quarter end followed by the earnings announcement 5 days later. Approximately 19 percent of the bank-quarters in our sample are cases like this in which the bank files the Call Report before the earnings announcement. 78 percent of these cases involve banks that later issue a press release to announce earnings, as opposed to the 22 percent of cases in which banks never issue a press release and simply file a 10-Q as the de facto earnings release. On average, the Call Report precedes the earnings release by eleven days (median is six days). These banks tend to be smaller (median assets of \$1.1 billion versus \$2.1

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<sup>13</sup> Because we tailor the day numbering scheme to the Call Report due date, the figures slightly understate the degree of Y-9C clustering. This occurs because the number of trading days between day 0 and the due date of the Y-9C varies across quarters. For example, in one quarter the Y-9C due date might fall on day +7 but in another quarter it might fall on day +8.

billion for the full sample) and 33 percent have analyst following. Approximately 68 percent of these banks repeat the pattern of filing the Call Report before the earnings announcement in other quarters. Banks that file a Call Report before an earnings announcement in at least one quarter do so an average of three times over our nine sample quarters.

[Insert Figure 2 here]

#### IV. RESEARCH DESIGN

##### Market Activity around Public Release Dates

We use the following specification to test for abnormal price volatility or trading volume around the release dates of earnings announcements, Call Reports, Y-9Cs, and 10-K/Qs:

$$RET_{it} \text{ or } VOL_{it} = \alpha + \beta_1 EA_{it} + \beta_2 EA\_EXPANDED_{it} + \beta_3 CALL_{it} + \beta_4 Y9C_{it} + \beta_5 10KQ_{it} + \varepsilon_{it} \quad (3)$$

for all  $i$  banks and  $t$  trading days. We estimate the model parameters using the trading days in the three months following quarter end.

The  $EA_{it}$ ,  $CALL_{it}$ ,  $Y9C_{it}$ , and  $10KQ_{it}$  explanatory variables are (1, 0) indicators denoting whether an earnings announcement, Call Report, Y-9C report, or 10-K/Q is filed by firm  $i$  on day  $t$ . As explained earlier, we remove a bank's day  $t$  from the sample if two or more filings occur on days  $t-1$  to  $t+1$ . Thus, the two-day RET and VOL metrics for a given filing event are unlikely to reflect market reaction to the other filings. Additionally, untabulated analysis shows that market activity around earnings announcements is abnormally high beginning one trading day before the announcement and continuing until three trading days after the announcement. To avoid the confounding effect of this market activity when isolating activity around other filing events, we include an indicator variable called  $EA\_EXPANDED$  that equals one on trading days  $-1$  and  $(+1,+3)$  relative to earnings announcement dates.

Next we augment equation (3) to determine whether the price or volume reaction depends

on the sequencing of the reports. We focus on the sequencing of the earnings announcement and the Call Report because they are almost always the first two reports in the sequence, and because no evidence of reaction to Y-9Cs and 10-K/Qs is found when estimating equation (3). The specification is as follows:

$$RET_{it} \text{ or } VOL_{it} = \alpha + \beta_1 EA1_{it} + \beta_2 EA2_{it} + \beta_3 EA\_EXPANDED_{it} + \beta_4 CALL1_{it} + \beta_5 CALL2_{it} + \beta_6 Y9C_{it} + \beta_7 10KQ_{it} + \varepsilon_{it} \quad (4)$$

The suffix of 1 or 2 on the EA and CALL variables denotes whether the report was filed first or second. EA1 (EA2) is an indicator variable for earnings announcement days that precede (follow) Call Report filing days. CALL1 (CALL2) is an indicator variable for Call Report filing days that precede (follow) earnings announcement days.  $\beta_1 > \beta_2$  and  $\beta_4 > \beta_5$  provides evidence that earlier filings preempt later filings due to redundancy of information.

### **Market Reactions and Bank Characteristics**

Next we examine whether market reactions to the filings vary cross-sectionally with bank characteristics. We continue to hold the sequencing of the filings constant as in equation (4), and interact EA1, EA2, CALL1, and CALL2 with variables that proxy for bank characteristics:

$$RET_{it} \text{ or } VOL_{it} = \alpha + \beta_1 EA1 + \beta_2 EA2 + \beta_3 EA\_EXPANDED_{it} + \beta_4 CALL1 + \beta_5 CALL2 + \beta_6 Z + \beta_7 EA1*Z + \beta_8 EA2*Z + \beta_9 CALL1*Z + \beta_{10} CALL2*Z + \beta_{11} Y9C + \beta_{12} 10KQ + \varepsilon \quad (5)$$

where Z is the bank characteristic (bank and time subscripts are dropped to ease readability). The bank characteristics we examine are size, capital ratio, asset-liability maturity gap, loss incurrence, and changes in earnings, loan loss reserves, and charge-offs (see Appendix for variable definitions).

The primary interaction of interest is CALL2\*Z because we are most interested in why investors react to a Call Report after they have seen the earnings announcement. Reactions to Call Reports may be stronger for large banks because of increased market attention. On the other hand,

large banks may have stronger information environments and more channels for information dissemination, which would make Call Reports less relevant. Reactions to Call Reports may be stronger for riskier banks, such as those with low capital ratios or large asset-liability maturity gaps, because investors desire more information about risk metrics and exposures than what is provided in an earnings announcement. Reactions to Call Reports may be stronger for banks with negative earnings due to the increased risk of financial distress posed by losses. On the other hand, reactions may be weaker for loss banks because they are more likely to exercise their abandonment option, reducing investors' propensity to capitalize quarterly innovations in financial performance into the stock price (Hayn 1995; Burgstahler and Dichev 1997). Reactions to Call Reports may be stronger when performance metrics such as earnings, loan losses, or charge-offs change dramatically from quarter to quarter.

### **Day 30 as an Approximation of the Call Report Filing Date**

The fact that Call Report releases are clustered in a tight window around the 30<sup>th</sup> day of the quarter creates the possibility that researchers can conduct meaningful tests of market reactions to Call Reports without having access to the exact release dates. We next investigate how closely the market reaction to Call Report releases can be approximated by assuming that all Call Reports are released on day 30. We replace the CALL1 and CALL2 variables in equation (4) with indicator variables that act as if each quarter's Call Report was filed on "day 30" (denoted A\_CALL1 and A\_CALL2), and we compare the results to the original equation (4). We also replace the Y9C indicator with an assumed Y-9C indicator (denoted A\_Y9C) that equals 1 on day 45 (40) following fourth (interim) quarter ends:

$$\begin{aligned}
 RET_{it} \text{ or } VOL_{it} = & \alpha + \beta_1 EA1_{it} + \beta_2 EA2_{it} + \beta_3 EA\_EXPANDED_{it} + \beta_4 A\_CALL1_{it} + \beta_5 A\_CALL2_{it} \\
 & + \beta_6 A\_Y9C_{it} + \beta_7 10KQ_{it} + \varepsilon_{it}
 \end{aligned}
 \tag{6}$$

Finally, to understand the history of the day 30 phenomenon, we extend the sample period back to 2000 and estimate equation (3) by year, replacing the CALL indicator with the assumed “day 30” Call Report indicator (A\_CALL):

$$RET_{it} \text{ or } VOL_{it} = \alpha + \beta_1 EA_{it} + \beta_2 EA\_EXPANDED_{it} + \beta_3 A\_CALL_{it} + \beta_4 A\_Y9C_{it} + \beta_5 10KQ_{it} + \varepsilon_{it} \quad (7)$$

We expect that the estimated coefficient on A\_CALL will be consistently positive and statistically significant over 2006 to 2013. Such a pattern in the coefficients would be consistent with abnormal market activity on day 30 beginning to occur after banking regulators completed the modernization project to streamline the processing and dissemination of regulatory reports.

## V. RESULTS

### Descriptive Statistics for Test Variables

Table 1, Panel A presents descriptive statistics for the two market reaction variables (RET and VOL) as well as the bank characteristic variables. RET has a mean of 1.235 which indicates that price volatility in the three months after quarter end is, on average, 23.5 percent higher than price volatility in the month that preceded the quarter end. Mean VOL of zero indicates that volume in the three months after quarter end tends to be similar to volume in the month preceding quarter end. Mean (median) bank assets (ASSETS) is \$44.5 (\$2.1) billion. Only 6.2% of our sample banks report negative earnings (LOSS). Table 1, Panel B presents Spearman and Pearson correlations among the variables. The two market reaction variables (RET and VOL) are positive and significantly correlated (0.201 Pearson and 0.133 Spearman).

[Insert Table 1 here]

### Descriptive Statistics for Amendments

Table 2, Panel A provides descriptive statistics on the frequency, timing, and magnitude of

amendments to Call Reports. The descriptive statistics reflect amendments that occur in the three months after quarter end, which is our window for tracking the release of the original regulatory reports and subsequent amendments in real time. Given that most Call Reports are filed around day 30, the statistics generally reflect amendments that are filed over the next 60 days.

Panel A shows that 974, or 36.4 percent, of Call Reports are amended in the three months after the quarter end. Untabulated analysis shows that amendments are particularly common in the first 16 days after release; the first 16 days account for 46 percent of the total amendments filed over the remainder of the quarter. An FDIC staff member explains that these early amendments likely stem from detailed reviews of the Call Reports conducted by FDIC analysts during the two weeks following submission. As discussed earlier, amendments often continue to be filed over the ensuing years; we find that six of ten randomly selected Call Reports from 2008 and 2009 were amended at least once over the next six years. The high rate of amendments, both over the near and long term, is surprising because Call Report instructions state that amendments are not required unless errors are material as defined in FASB Concepts Statement 8 (FDIC 2013, 7). However, an FDIC staff member indicated to us that in practice Call Reports are amended for errors of most any size.

Only 115 of the 974 amendments (11.8 percent) alter the total assets balance, and the mean change in assets across the 115 amendments is miniscule: \$2.92 million or 0.2 percent of total assets. Only 198 of the 974 amendments (20.3 percent) alter the Tier 1 Capital Ratio, and the mean (median) difference in the Tier 1 Capital Ratio across the 198 amendments is 21 (6) basis points, which represents a 1.3 (0.4) percent change in the Tier 1 Capital Ratio for these banks.

In Panel B we examine the market reaction to the 761 amended Call Reports that do not coincide with an earnings announcement, Y9C, and/or 10-K/Q release. There is no evidence of

price or volume reactions to the amendments, which is consistent with the small effects on assets and capital ratios observed in Panel A. Taken together the results from Table 2 indicate that a significant number of Call Reports are amended, but the amendments tend to be immaterial as evidenced by the errors' small mean size and lack of market reaction.

[Insert Table 2 here]

### **Univariate Tests of Market Reaction**

Table 3 compares the return (RET) and volume (VOL) metrics over the two-day (0, +1) window around event days and non-event days for each of the four types of filings (EA, CALL, Y9C, 10KQ). As explained in the sample selection section, we exclude an event day if the bank releases another filing within one day of the event day. Non-event days are the trading days in a quarter when none of the four types of filings are released. Results for earnings announcement event days are labeled as "EA" in the table. Consistent with prior research (e.g. Beaver 1968), we find higher mean and median RET and VOL on earnings announcement event days relative to non-event days ( $p < 0.01$ ). Mean and median RET on earnings announcement days are approximately three times higher compared to non-event days.

The earnings announcement precedes the Call Report in 1,556 cases (labeled as EA1) and follows the Call Report in 185 cases (labeled as EA2). Mean and median RET are statistically significantly higher on earnings announcement event days regardless of whether the earnings announcement precedes or follows the Call Report. The reaction is somewhat higher for earnings announcements that precede Call Reports (mean RET of 3.5 for EA1 days versus 2.6 for EA2 days). Results for VOL are similar except that mean VOL around EA2 events is not higher compared to that on non-event days. The results are preliminary indications that market reaction to earnings announcements is attenuated when they follow Call Reports. Later we formally test for



attenuation using regression.

Next we examine reactions around Call Report filing dates (labeled CALL). We find higher mean and median RET and VOL on Call Report filing days relative to non-event days ( $p < 0.01$ ).<sup>14</sup> Mean (median) RET on Call Report filing days is 18 (26) percent higher than on non-event days. Mean and median RET are statistically significantly higher on Call Report event days regardless of whether the Call Report precedes or follows the earnings announcement (labeled CALL1 and CALL2). Mean and median VOL are statistically significantly higher only when the Call Report follows the earnings announcement. The evidence suggests that, despite the prior release of earnings, the market finds the Call Report to be informative.<sup>15</sup>

There is no evidence of higher price volatility or volume on Y-9C or 10-K/Q event days. In fact, mean and median VOL tend to be statistically significantly lower on Y-9C and 10-K/Q event days. Taken together, the results indicate that the equity market finds earnings announcements and the Call Reports immediately informative, but not Y-9Cs and 10-K/Qs.

[Insert Table 3 here]

### **Regression-based Tests of Market Reaction**

We use regression to examine: (1) whether the equity market responds to the release of the

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<sup>14</sup> To ensure that t-statistics for the difference in mean and median tests are well specified in light of the large overall sample size and skewness in the RET variable, we simulate a distribution of t-statistics by repeating the following randomization procedure 10,000 times. We randomly assign 2,061 of the 159,019 total sample observations to a pseudo-CALL group (because there are 2,061 observations in the actual CALL group) and the rest to a pseudo-non-event group. Then we compute t-statistics for the difference in mean and median RET across the pseudo-CALL group and the pseudo-non-event group. The resulting empirical distributions of t-statistics closely conform to the theoretical t-distribution. The empirical distribution of t-statistics for the difference-in-means (Wilcoxon) test has a 90<sup>th</sup>, 95<sup>th</sup>, and 99<sup>th</sup> percentile of 1.27, 1.62, and 2.27 (1.28, 1.64, and 2.26). The corresponding percentiles for the theoretical distribution of t-statistics are 1.28, 1.65, and 2.33. The slightly lower percentile values found in the empirical distributions indicates that in our sample it is slightly *more* difficult to reject the null hypothesis at the given confidence level using parametric tests.

<sup>15</sup> In this analysis, many EA2 and CALL1 events are omitted because they occur within one day of other filings. This explains why CALL1 events represent only 10 percent of total CALL events in this sample in contrast to the 19 percent previously reported for the full sample. Separately, the counts of EA1 and CALL2 events differ due to five bank quarters in which the release dates of the Call Report and the 10K/Q are within one day of each other, causing five CALL2 events to be omitted from the sample.

Call Report and the Y-9C; (2) whether the market response depends on the timing of the regulatory reports relative to earnings announcements; (3) whether the timing of the regulatory reports affects responses to earnings announcements; and, (4) whether market reaction varies with bank characteristics. The regression framework allows us to cluster standard errors by day to account for the fact that many of the event dates occur on the same day across banks. It also allows us to control for the several days of heightened market activity around earnings announcements (using EA\_EXPANDED).

Table 4 presents results from estimating equation (3). Column 1 (3) presents results when using RET (VOL) as the dependent variable. Both columns indicate positive and statistically significant price and volume reactions to earnings announcements (EA) and Call Reports (CALL). In column 1, the estimated EA coefficient of 2.26 represents a 192 percent increase in mean price volatility across sample banks over the two-day earnings announcement window (192 percent =  $2.26 \text{ estimated EA coefficient} / 1.18 \text{ non-event day mean from the intercept}$ ). Market activity also tends to be high during the days around earnings announcements, as evidenced by the significantly positive coefficient on EA\_EXPANDED in both regressions. The estimated CALL coefficient of 0.25 in the RET regression indicates a 21 percent increase in mean price volatility over the two-day Call Report filing window. The results provide no evidence of market reaction to the release of Y-9Cs or 10-K/Qs, which tend to be released late in the reporting season. The estimated coefficients on the Y9C and 10KQ variables are not statistically different from zero or are statistically negative.

We next examine whether the market response to Call Reports and earnings announcements depends on the order in which the two reports are released. The results from the RET and VOL regressions in columns 2 and 4 indicate that, when the Call Report precedes the earnings announcement (EA2), the market response to the earnings announcement is attenuated; an F-test

indicates that in both regressions the estimated coefficient on EA2 is significantly lower than the estimated coefficient on EA1 ( $p < 0.01$ ). The estimated EA2 coefficient is lower by 41 percent in the RET regression and 94 percent in the VOL regression. The results indicate that Call Reports issued in advance of earnings announcements tend to preempt information in earnings announcements.

Regarding the reverse scenario, we do not find evidence that earnings announcements tend to preempt information in Call Reports. The estimated CALL1 coefficients in the RET and VOL regressions are not statistically higher than the estimated CALL2 coefficients. In fact, the coefficient magnitudes are not directionally consistent with preemption; the CALL2 coefficients have higher magnitudes than do the CALL1 coefficients, and the CALL1 coefficient in the VOL regression is not statistically different from zero.

[Insert Table 4 here]

### **Supplemental Analysis of Reactions to Call Reports**

To investigate whether the estimated EA1 and EA2 coefficients differ simply because of the types of banks that tend to fall into the EA1 versus EA2 categories, we re-estimate the regression on the subsample of banks that fall into both categories during the sample period. Untabulated results are similar. We continue to find a statistically significant difference between the EA1 and EA2 coefficients and do not find a statistical difference between the CALL1 and CALL2 coefficients.

#### ***Spillover Effects***

Call Report releases could generate two types of spillover effects. First, as Call Report releases begin to build in the days leading up to day 30, information from these early reports could spill over to the stocks of banks that have not yet filed. Second, the comprehensive information about the banking industry that emerges from the flood of Call Reports released on day 30 could

spill over to the stocks of banks that do not file on day 30.

To test for the first type of spillover effect, we add five indicator variables to equation (3) that denote days 25 to 29 (DAY25, DAY26, etc.). Each variable equals 1 on the designated day for banks whose Call Reports are *not* released on that day. Positive estimated coefficients on these variables would indicate that information from early Call Reports spills over to banks whose Call Reports are not released on those days. To test for the second type of spillover effect, we include two indicator variables that equal 1 on day 30 for banks whose Call Reports are *not* released on day 30. DAY30\_PRE (DAY30\_POST) equals 1 on day 30 for banks whose Call Reports are released before (after) day 30. Positive estimated coefficients on these variables would indicate that information from day 30 Call Reports spills over to banks whose Call Reports are not released on day 30. In this regression, we also partition the CALL indicator variable by whether the bank's report is actually released on day 30 (CALL\_30) or not on day 30 (CALL\_NON30). These two variables aid in understanding whether the market reaction to Call Reports detected in the base specification is driven by market attention on day 30; a significantly positive coefficient on CALL\_30 but not on CALL\_NON30 would indicate that Call Reports elicit market reaction only during times of high investor attention stemming from high volumes of filings. Li and Ramesh (2009) report a similar finding for 10-Ks.

Results are presented in Table 5. We find no evidence of either type of spillover effect. None of the estimated coefficients on the DAY25, DAY26, etc. indicator variables are statistically significant in the RET regression, and several are statistically negative in the VOL regression. Estimated coefficients on DAY30\_PRE and DAY30\_POST are statistically insignificant, providing no evidence of a spillover effect on day 30 to banks whose Call Reports are not released on day 30. Instead, heightened market activity is detected only on the day when a bank's Call Report is

actually released, whether it is day 30 or another day; both CALL\_30 and CALL\_NON30 have significantly positive estimated coefficients.

[Insert Table 5 here]

### ***Concurrent events: FOMC and GDP announcements***

Statements of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) and “advance” estimates of quarterly growth in gross domestic product are sometimes released on or near the 30<sup>th</sup> day of the quarter. During the sample period, 6 of the 18 FOMC statements and 4 of the 9 GDP announcements were released on or within a day of day 30. The market-adjustment embedded in the RET and VOL metrics implicitly controls for these events to the extent that they affect both bank and non-bank stocks. For additional control, we re-estimate equation (3) after including two indicator variables that equal 1 on the days of FOMC statements and GDP announcements. In untabulated analysis we find that including the indicators has little effect on the coefficient magnitude or significance of CALL. In the RET regression, the coefficient declines slightly from 0.2484 to 0.2471 and remains significant at the 5 percent level. In the VOL regression, the coefficient magnitude and significance level do not change. Thus, these events do not confound the main results.

### **Regression-based Tests of Variation in Market Reaction**

Table 6 presents results from estimating equation (5), which interacts CALL1, CALL2, EA1, and EA2 with cross-sectional attributes of the banks. The CALL2 interactions are of primary interest because they reflect the factors affecting a Call Report’s information content after the market has seen the earnings announcement. Panel A (B) presents results for the RET (VOL) regressions.

The first column presents interactions involving bank size (LogASSETS). The estimated

coefficient on the CALL2\*LogASSETS interaction is negative in both the RET and VOL regression and is statistically significant in the RET regression ( $p < 0.01$ ), indicating that larger banks tend to have less price reaction to Call Reports released after earnings announcements. This finding is consistent with larger banks providing more information through channels other than the Call Report, which, in turn, makes the Call Report less relevant to investors. One opportunity to provide more information is the announcement of earnings and the accompanying report. Larger banks do indeed appear to have more informative earnings announcements, as evidenced by the positive and statistically significant estimated coefficients on the EA1\*LogASSETS and EA2\*LogASSETS interactions. Thus, reaction to large banks' Call Reports could tend to be lower in part because these banks' earnings announcements (and related earnings conference calls) tend to preempt more Call Report information.

We find marginally significant relations between bank risk and Call Report reactions. Volume reaction around CALL1 and CALL2 events increases with low capital ratios (LOW\_CR) and higher asset/liability maturity gaps (LTGAP) ( $p < 0.10$  except for the CALL1\*LTGAP coefficient which has a p-value  $< 0.01$ ). Price reaction around CALL2 events increases with asset/liability maturity gaps ( $p < 0.10$ ) but has no statistically significant association with low capital ratios.

Price reaction to CALL2 events also varies significantly with earnings characteristics. Price reaction around CALL2 events decreases with the incurrence of losses (LOSS) ( $p < 0.01$ ). This result is consistent with Hayn (1995) which finds that loss firms have muted reactions to earnings reports because liquidation becomes more likely. We do not find consistent evidence that reaction to Call Reports varies with the absolute value of the change in earnings ( $\Delta E$ ) or absolute value of the quarterly change in loan charge-offs ( $\Delta \text{CHRG\_OFF}$ ). Contrary to expectation, price reaction

around CALL2 events decreases with the absolute value of the quarterly change in loan loss ( $\Delta LL$ ). In the volume regressions, neither LOSS,  $\Delta E$ ,  $\Delta LL$ , nor  $\Delta CHRG\_OFF$  has a statistically significant interaction with CALL2. Taken together, we find strong evidence that price reaction to Call Reports decreases in bank size and weaker evidence that price and volume reaction increase in bank risk.<sup>16</sup>

[Insert Table 6 here]

### **Blind Approximation of Market Reaction to Call Reports**

Because a historical record of the public release dates of Call Reports is not publicly available, we investigate how closely the market reaction to Call Reports can be approximated without having access to the actual release dates. Given our finding that more than half of all Call Reports are reported on day 30, we create an approximation of the CALL variable, called A\_CALL, that equals 1 on “day 30” of the quarter for all banks regardless of their actual Call Report filing date.

Table 7 contains the results from estimating equation (6). The estimated coefficients on A\_CALL in Table 7 and CALL in Table 4 have similar magnitudes. In the RET regressions, the magnitude of the A\_CALL coefficient indicates that mean price volatility is 24 percent higher than the non-event day mean (significant at the 10 percent level). The corresponding quantity for the CALL coefficient in Table 4 is 21 percent (significant at the 5 percent level). The magnitudes of the two coefficients are not statistically different from each other. When sequencing is considered, inferences based on approximated dates differ somewhat from inferences based on actual dates. The

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<sup>16</sup> We attempted to determine whether reaction to Call Reports varies with bank complexity and the level of detail in the earnings announcement, but the measures are highly correlated with bank size and the regressions exhibit signs of multicollinearity after including interactions that control for bank size. Our measures of complexity are the number of Y-9C cells containing non-zero values and an indicator variable capturing derivatives usage. The two measures have correlation coefficients with logged bank assets of 0.91 and 0.68. Alternative measures of complexity that focus on the non-zero cells in particular Y-9C schedules are also highly correlated with bank size. Our measure of earnings announcement detail is a word count of the earnings release, which has a correlation coefficient with logged bank assets of 0.68.

magnitude of the A\_CALL1 coefficient in the RET regression indicates that mean price volatility increases by 11 percent on approximated Call Report filing dates that precede the earnings announcements. However, the coefficient t-statistic of 0.79 is far from conventional significance thresholds. In contrast, the CALL1 coefficient t-statistic in Table 4 is 2.52.

Unlike the A\_CALL1 approximation, the A\_CALL2 approximation produces results similar to those obtained using actual release dates. The magnitude of the A\_CALL2 coefficient indicates that mean price volatility increases by 26 percent on approximated Call Report dates that follow earnings announcements, with a t-statistic of 1.47. The corresponding quantities for the CALL2 coefficient in Table 4 are 22 percent and 1.85. The magnitudes of the two coefficients do not differ statistically from each other. Thus, it appears that assumed day 30 release dates can be used effectively to approximate market reactions to Call Reports when earnings are announced prior to day 30, but not when earnings are announced after day 30. One reason that the A\_CALL2 approximation is superior to the A\_CALL1 approximation is that a higher percentage of A\_CALL2 banks actually have their reports released on day 30. We find that 65 (43) percent of A\_CALL2 (A\_CALL1) banks actually release their Call Reports on day 30. Thus, researchers can eliminate a subset of banks that are unlikely to have their reports released on day 30 by confining the sample to banks that announce earnings before day 30. Results using the volume-based measure of market reaction around day 30 are similar across approximated and actual release dates.<sup>17</sup>

[Insert Table 7 here]

### **How Long has Abnormal Market Activity Occurred on “Day 30” in the Banking Industry?**

Our final analysis examines how long and how consistently “day 30” of the quarter has been characterized by heightened market activity in the banking industry. We expand the sample period

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<sup>17</sup> Approximations do not meaningfully improve when setting A\_CALL equal to 1 on days 29 to 31 or days 27 to 31 (rather than day 30 only).



to the years 2000 to 2013 and include all publicly traded BHCs that have the daily CRSP data necessary for constructing test variables.<sup>18</sup> We use this sample to estimate equation (7) by calendar year. The estimated coefficient on A\_CALL reflects the extent to which there is abnormal price volatility or volume on the four “day 30s” that occur in a given year. Table 8, Panel A (B), presents results from estimating equation (7) when RET (VOL) is the dependent variable. Across the eight RET regressions for the years 2006 to 2013, the estimated A\_CALL coefficients are statistically positive in four years, and statistically negative in one year. In contrast, none of the six RET regressions between 2000 and 2005 have statistically positive A\_CALL coefficients, and one has a statistically negative coefficient. The VOL regressions exhibit a similar pattern. The estimated A\_CALL coefficients are statistically positive in four of the eight VOL regressions between 2006 and 2013 and are not statistically positive in any of the six regressions between 2000 and 2005. Combining the RET and VOL results, we find that five of the eight years between 2006 and 2013 exhibit abnormally high price volatility and/or volume around day 30, while none of the six years between 2000 and 2005 do. This pattern is consistent with the late 2005 completion of the “modernization project” undertaken by bank regulators to speed the processing and public dissemination of regulatory reports.

[Insert Table 8 here]

## VI. CONCLUSION

Each quarter, banks’ Call Reports and Y-9Cs are publicly released in the same general time frame as earnings announcements and SEC filings. Because the core of the bank regulatory reports is a set of GAAP-based financial statements, the reports overlap with information in earnings

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<sup>18</sup> We obtained the database of BHCs from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York ([http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/banking\\_research/datasets.html](http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/banking_research/datasets.html)). The dataset yields 769 BHCs with stock returns available on CRSP sometime between January 1, 2000 and December 31, 2013.

announcements and SEC filings. The bank regulatory reports tend to contain more information about particular operating activities such as mortgage lending and securitizations, but lack footnotes and other qualitative disclosures. By tracking the release of each report from January 1, 2012 to March 31, 2014, we find that the majority of Call Reports become public on “day 30,” defined as the 30th calendar day after quarter end or the next business day if the 30<sup>th</sup> calendar day falls on a weekend or holiday. Y-9Cs are released later. We investigate the role of these reports in banks’ information environments.

We find that Call Reports elicit statistically significant stock price and volume reactions when they are publicly released. In contrast, Y-9Cs do not, likely because their information content is preempted by earlier filings. Call Reports tend to elicit significant market reactions even when they follow earnings announcements. When the Call Report follows (precedes) the earnings announcement, mean price volatility around the report release date is 22 (17) percent higher than the non-event day mean. Call Reports also appear to preempt some of the information in earnings announcements; when a Call Report precedes an earnings announcement, mean price volatility around earnings announcements is 41 percent lower.

The clustering of Call Reports around day 30, and the resulting market reaction, have implications for practice, regulation, and future research. The large amount of information about banks that is released around day 30 is relevant to portfolio allocation decisions concerning exposure to individual bank stocks and exposure to the industry as a whole. The information becomes available in a standardized format well before 10-Ks and 10-Qs are available, and sometimes before earnings are announced. The predictable increase in industry-level volatility around day 30 may also be relevant to investment strategies that are sensitive to volatility, such as option straddles. Relevant for banking regulation, the findings imply that bank stock prices respond

to reports that bank regulators have designed for supervisory purposes, which supports the notion that equity market values could be a useful signal for regulatory supervision (Furlong and Williams 2006; Curry et al. 2003).

The report dissemination process is more opaque than SEC-governed processes. The exact timing of report releases does not appear to be widely known by market participants; the report due dates are a matter of public record but the timing of the releases leading up to the due dates is not. Additionally, the process of amending reports erases historical data and provides no indication of which items were amended. In general, unlike SEC-designed processes for releasing financial information, bank regulators' processes lack advanced notices, public alerts, and a historical archive of activity. A more user-friendly and orderly process of dissemination may allow more information to be impounded into stock prices more quickly.

There are two main implications for academic research. First, for market studies in general, if banks are included in the sample, then research designs should account for banks' abnormal market movements around day 30 and the potential preemption of earnings announcements or other disclosures that follow day 30. Second, for research that seeks to study the market effects of bank regulatory reports, it appears that researchers can conduct meaningful tests by exploiting the clustering of Call Reports around day 30. For banks that announce earnings before day 30, we find that market reaction tests that use assumed day 30 release dates for Call Reports yield similar results to tests that use actual release dates. We find evidence that the "day 30" clustering assumption is valid for years going back to 2006, which is consistent with the completion date of the "modernization project" undertaken by regulators to streamline the processing and public dissemination of regulatory reports. To encourage and improve research in this area, bank regulators could publish the release dates. Such research could lead to better understanding of the

usefulness of market prices as supervisory signals.

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## APPENDIX

### Variable Definitions

Note: “Day 30” means the 30<sup>th</sup> day of the quarter or the next trading day if the 30<sup>th</sup> day is non-trading. “Day 40” and “day 45” follow the same convention. All variables that are set equal to 1 under the conditions described below equal 0 otherwise. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1<sup>st</sup> and 99<sup>th</sup> percentile. All items beginning with “bhck”, “bhdm”, or “bhfn” come from Federal Reserve Y-9C reports.

ASSETS = total assets (bhck2170) at the beginning-of-quarter.

A\_CALL = 1 if the date is day 30. The observation is omitted if the date is within one day of the earnings announcement, assumed Y-9C, or 10K/Q dates. The assumed Y-9C date is day 45 (40) of the fourth (interim) quarter.

A\_Y9C = 1 if the date is day 45 (40) of the fourth (interim) quarter. The observation is omitted if the date is within one day of the earnings announcement, assumed Call Report, or 10K/Q dates. The assumed Call Report date is day 30.

CALL = 1 if the date is the Call Report release date. The observation is omitted if the date is within one day of the earnings announcement, Y-9C, or the 10K/Q dates.

CALL1 = 1 if CALL=1 and the Call Report precedes the earnings announcement.

CALL2 = 1 if CALL=1 and the Call Report follows the earnings announcement.

CALL\_30 = 1 if CALL=1 and the bank’s Call Report is released on day 30.

CALL\_NON30 = 1 if CALL=1 and the bank’s Call Report is not released on day 30.

DAYX = 1 on the designated day (e.g., DAY25, DAY26) for banks whose Call Reports are not released on that day.

DAY30\_PRE = 1 on day 30 for banks whose Call Reports are released before day 30.

DAY30\_POST = 1 on day 30 for banks whose Call Reports are released after day 30.

EA = 1 if the date is an earnings announcement date. The observation is omitted if the date is within one day of the Call Report, Y-9C, or 10K/Q dates.

EA1 = 1 if EA=1 and the earnings announcement precedes the Call Report.

EA2 = 1 if EA=1 and the earnings announcement follows the Call Report.

EA\_EXPANDED = 1 if the date is one day before or one, two, or three days after an earnings announcement date.

LogASSETS = natural log of ASSETS.

LOSS = 1 if the bank reported negative earnings (bhckg104) in quarter q.

LOW\_CR = 1 if the bank's Tier 1 capital ratio (bhck7206) is in the lowest ten percent of the sample, zero otherwise.

LTGAP = the absolute difference between long term earning assets, excluding securities, and long term financial liabilities, scaled by market value of equity (CSHPRQ\*PRCCQ from Compustat) and divided by 100. Long term earning assets excluding securities are computed as bhck0395+bhck0397+bhck1754+bhck1773+bhdmb987+bhckb989+ bhckb528-bhck5526-bhck3197-bhck0384-bhck0387-bhcka511. Long term financial liabilities are computed as bhdm6636+bhfn6636 +bhck3190+bhck4062+bhckc699-bhck3296-bhck3298-bhck3409.

RET = firm i's market-adjusted stock return over days 0 and 1. The return metric is computed as follows:  $RET_{it} = \frac{\sum_{t=0}^1 [R_{it} - R_{Mt}]^2}{E(\sum_{t=0}^1 [R_{it} - R_{Mt}]^2)}$ , where the numerator is the cumulative squared market-adjusted return over days 0 and 1 and the denominator is the mean of this same measure during the last month of the previous quarter.  $R_{Mt}$  is the CRSP value-weighted return (VWRETD).

VOL = firm i's market-adjusted volume over days 0 and 1. Following Garfinkel and Sokobin (2006), the volume metric is computed as follows:  $VOL_{it} = \sum_{t=0}^1 \left[ \frac{V_{it}}{Shs_{it}} - \frac{V_{Mt}}{Shs_{Mt}} \right] / 2 - E \left( \sum_{t=0}^1 \left[ \frac{V_{it}}{Shs_{it}} - \frac{V_{Mt}}{Shs_{Mt}} \right] / 2 \right)$ , where  $V_{it}$  ( $V_{Mt}$ ) is firm i's (CRSP universe) trading volume on day t, and  $Shs_{it}$  ( $Shs_{Mt}$ ) is firm i's (CRSP universe) shares outstanding on day t. The first part of the metric sums firm i's share turnover ( $V_{it} / Shs_{it}$ ) over days t and t+1 and adjusts the firm's share turnover for the share turnover of the market on those same days. The second part of the metric adjusts this market-adjusted turnover metric for the firm's average level of market-adjusted turnover during the last month of the previous quarter.

Y9C = 1 if the date is a FR Y-9C release date. The observation is omitted if the date is within one day of the earnings announcement, Call Report, or 10K/Q dates.

$\Delta$ CHRG\_OFF = the absolute difference in charge-offs as a percentage of loans and leases (bhck4635/bhckb528) in quarter q minus the same quantity in quarter q-1.

$\Delta$ E = the absolute difference in earnings (bhck4340) in quarter q minus earnings in quarter q-4, scaled by market value of equity (cshoq\*prccq).


$\Delta$ LL = the absolute difference in allowance for loan and lease losses as a percentage of loans and leases (bhck3123/bhckb528) in quarter q minus the same quantity in quarter q-1.

10KQ = 1 if the date is a 10K/Q filing date. The observation is omitted if the date is within one day of the earnings announcement, Call Report, or Y-9C dates.




**FIGURE 1**  
**Public Release Dates of Earnings Announcements, Call Reports, FR Y-9Cs, and 10-K/Qs**  
 (day 0 is the 30<sup>th</sup> day of the quarter)


*Panel A: Full Sample*



Panel B: Fourth-Quarters




Panel C: Interim Quarters



Each panel plots the percentage of earnings announcements, Call Reports, Y-9Cs, and 10-K/Qs released each day over the 62 trading days following quarter end. Day 0 is the 30<sup>th</sup> calendar day after quarter-end or the next trading day if the 30<sup>th</sup> calendar day is non-trading. An additional plot that corresponds to the secondary axis is the mean price volatility metric (RET) by day across banks, excluding days (-1, +3) relative to earnings announcements. The sample is based on 2,673 firm-quarters across 319 BHCs. See Appendix for variable descriptions.

**FIGURE 2**  
**Disclosure Timelines for Three Sample Bank Holding Companies**

*Panel A: Timeline for BBCN Bancorp*



<sup>1</sup>The commercial bank within BBCN Bancorp that reported its Call Report on this day was BBNC Bank.


*Panel B: Timeline for JPMorgan Chase*



<sup>2</sup>The commercial banks within JPMorgan Chase that filed Call Reports on this day were JPMorgan Bank and Trust Company, National Association; JPMorgan Chase Bank, Dearborn; and Chase Bank USA, National Association.

<sup>3</sup>The commercial bank within JPMorgan Chase that filed its Call Report on this day was JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association.

*Panel C: Timeline for Old National Bancorp*



<sup>4</sup>The commercial bank within Old National Bancorp that reported its Call Report on this day was Old National Bank.

**TABLE 1**  
**Descriptive Statistics and Correlations**

*Panel A: Full Sample Descriptive Statistics*

<b>Variable</b>	n	mean	std. dev.	Q1	median	Q3
RET	164,821	1.235	2.107	0.183	0.530	1.343
VOL	164,821	0.000	0.003	-0.001	0.000	0.001
ASSETS	164,821	44,511	240,902	1,030	2,122	6,802
LogASSETS	164,821	8.103	1.656	6.937	7.660	8.825
LOW_CR	164,821	0.100	0.300	0.000	0.000	0.000
LTGAP	164,821	0.049	0.078	0.018	0.033	0.053
LOSS	164,821	0.062	0.240	0.000	0.000	0.000
ΔE	161,066	0.037	0.209	0.002	0.005	0.012
ΔLL	164,324	0.001	0.002	0.000	0.001	0.001
ΔCHRG_OFF	164,142	0.001	0.004	0.000	0.000	0.001

*Panel B: Pearson (top) and Spearman (bottom) Correlations for the Full Sample*

	RET	VOL	ASSETS	LogASSETS	LOW_CR	LTGAP	LOSS	ΔE	ΔLL	ΔCHRG_OFF
RET		<b>0.201</b>	<b>-0.015</b>	<b>-0.013</b>	0.006	<b>0.013</b>	<b>0.003</b>	<b>0.008</b>	<b>-0.011</b>	<b>-0.011</b>
VOL	<b>0.133</b>		<b>-0.026</b>	<b>-0.039</b>	<b>-0.007</b>	<b>-0.008</b>	<b>-0.006</b>	0.003	<b>-0.007</b>	<b>-0.010</b>
ASSETS	<b>0.032</b>	<b>-0.082</b>		<b>0.595</b>	<b>-0.041</b>	<b>0.035</b>	<b>-0.004</b>	<b>-0.019</b>	<b>0.026</b>	<b>-0.044</b>
LogASSETS	<b>0.032</b>	<b>-0.082</b>	<b>1.000</b>		<b>0.058</b>	<b>-0.077</b>	<b>-0.068</b>	<b>-0.078</b>	<b>-0.032</b>	<b>-0.118</b>
LOW_CR	0.001	<b>-0.014</b>	<b>0.090</b>	<b>0.090</b>		<b>0.198</b>	<b>0.110</b>	<b>0.194</b>	<b>0.034</b>	<b>0.074</b>
LTGAP	<b>-0.015</b>	<b>0.028</b>	<b>-0.077</b>	<b>-0.077</b>	<b>0.052</b>		<b>0.314</b>	<b>0.457</b>	<b>0.146</b>	<b>0.159</b>
LOSS	<b>-0.017</b>	<b>-0.013</b>	<b>-0.092</b>	<b>-0.092</b>	<b>0.110</b>	<b>0.150</b>		<b>0.309</b>	<b>0.309</b>	<b>0.295</b>
ΔE	<b>-0.021</b>	<b>-0.003</b>	<b>-0.162</b>	<b>-0.162</b>	<b>0.038</b>	<b>0.236</b>	<b>0.343</b>		<b>0.219</b>	<b>0.198</b>
ΔLL	<b>-0.029</b>	<b>-0.017</b>	<b>-0.007</b>	<b>-0.007</b>	0.002	<b>0.158</b>	<b>0.206</b>	<b>0.235</b>		<b>0.335</b>
ΔCHRG_OFF	<b>-0.025</b>	<b>0.011</b>	<b>-0.233</b>	<b>-0.233</b>	<b>0.005</b>	<b>0.146</b>	<b>0.205</b>	<b>0.291</b>	<b>0.288</b>	

**Bold** denotes significantly different from zero at the 10 percent level or higher. See Appendix for variable descriptions.

**TABLE 2**  
**Descriptive Statistics for Amended Call Reports**

*Panel A: Descriptive Statistics for Amended Call Reports*

	n	% of total Call Reports
Amended Call Reports	974	36.44%

**Number of calendar days between original and restated Call Report**

n	mean	std. dev.	Q1	median	Q3
974	22.12	14.20	11.00	18.50	33.00

**Difference in total assets between original and restated Call Report, unscaled and scaled by assets**

n	mean	std. dev.	Q1	median	Q3
115	\$2.92	\$5.77	\$0.16	\$0.67	\$3.04
115	0.156%	0.322%	0.012%	0.041%	0.140%

**Difference in Tier1 capital ratio**

n	mean	std. dev.	Q1	median	Q3
198	0.210	0.414	0.020	0.060	0.210

Tier 1 capital ratio is from the Federal Reserve Y9C report (bhck7206).

*Panel B: Market Reaction to Amended Call Reports (that do not coincide with other filings, n=761)*

<b>Market reaction to a restated Call Report</b>						
	n	mean	std. dev.	Q1	median	Q3
RET	761	1.129	1.856	0.173	0.488	1.276
VOL	761	-0.00047	0.00305	-0.00167	-0.00049	0.00070
<b>Non-Event Days</b>						
	n	mean	std. dev.	Q1	median	Q3
RET	156,958	1.207	2.045	0.181	0.527	1.324
VOL	156,958	-0.00015	0.00339	-0.00147	-0.00030	0.00098
RET Difference			-0.0778		-0.0392	
VOL Difference			-0.0003		0.0008	

\*\*\*, \*\*, \* denote significantly different from zero at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively (one-tailed if sign is in the predicted direction, two-tailed otherwise). T-tests (Wilcoxon signed-rank tests) are used for assessing means (medians). See Appendix for variable descriptions.

**TABLE 3**  
**Market Reaction to Earnings Announcements, Call Reports, FR Y-9C Reports, and 10-K/Q filings**

Variable	RET				VOL				
	Event	Non-Event			Event	Non-Event			
<b>EA</b>	Mean	3.441	1.207	Difference in Mean	2.234	0.00159	-0.00015	Difference in Mean	0.00175
	Median	1.470	0.527	Difference in Median	0.942	0.00031	-0.00030	Difference in Median	0.00061
	Std. dev.	4.498	2.045	t-stat	21.855 ***	0.00523	0.00339	t-stat	14.697 ***
	n	1,942	156,958	Wilcoxon	27.129 ***	1,942	156,958	Wilcoxon	17.256 ***
<b>EA1</b>	Mean	3.533	1.207	Difference in Mean	2.326	0.00166	-0.00015	Difference in Mean	0.00181
	Median	1.575	0.527	Difference in Median	1.048	0.00040	-0.00030	Difference in Median	0.00070
	Std. dev.	4.507	2.045	t-stat	20.336 ***	0.00518	0.00339	t-stat	13.773 ***
	n	1,556	156,958	Wilcoxon	25.931 ***	1,556	156,958	Wilcoxon	17.032 ***
<b>EA2</b>	Mean	2.577	1.207	Difference in Mean	1.370	-0.00006	-0.00015	Difference in Mean	0.00009
	Median	0.865	0.527	Difference in Median	0.337	-0.00037	-0.00030	Difference in Median	-0.00008
	Std. dev.	3.936	2.045	t-stat	4.721 ***	0.00225	0.00339	t-stat	0.558
	n	185	156,958	Wilcoxon	6.102 ***	185	156,958	Wilcoxon	1.504 *
<b>CALL</b>	Mean	1.425	1.207	Difference in Mean	0.217	0.00004	-0.00015	Difference in Mean	0.00020
	Median	0.663	0.527	Difference in Median	0.136	-0.00019	-0.00030	Difference in Median	0.00011
	Std. dev.	2.225	2.045	t-stat	4.412 ***	0.00256	0.00339	t-stat	3.489 ***
	n	2,061	156,958	Wilcoxon	7.227 ***	2,061	156,958	Wilcoxon	6.512 ***
<b>CALL1</b>	Mean	1.382	1.207	Difference in Mean	0.175	-0.00041	-0.00015	Difference in Mean	-0.00025
	Median	0.986	0.527	Difference in Median	0.459	-0.00067	-0.00030	Difference in Median	-4.01981
	Std. dev.	1.186	2.045	t-stat	2.002 **	0.00203	0.00339	t-stat	-1.700 **
	n	185	156,958	Wilcoxon	5.890 ***	185	156,958	Wilcoxon	1.061
<b>CALL2</b>	Mean	1.438	1.207	Difference in Mean	0.230	0.00015	-0.00015	Difference in Mean	0.00031
	Median	0.633	0.527	Difference in Median	0.106	-0.00004	-0.00030	Difference in Median	0.00025
	Std. dev.	2.269	2.045	t-stat	3.982 ***	0.00251	0.00339	t-stat	4.765 ***
	n	1,551	156,958	Wilcoxon	4.975 ***	1,551	156,958	Wilcoxon	6.514 ***
<b>Y9C</b>	Mean	1.159	1.207	Difference in Mean	-0.048	-0.00034	-0.00015	Difference in Mean	-0.00018
	Median	0.460	0.527	Difference in Median	-0.067	-0.00038	-0.00030	Difference in Median	-0.00008
	Std. dev.	2.075	2.045	t-stat	-1.066	0.00359	0.00339	t-stat	-2.307 **
	n	2,131	156,958	Wilcoxon	-4.072 ***	2,131	156,958	Wilcoxon	-3.163 ***
<b>Y9C (BEFORE 10KQ)</b>	Mean	1.228	1.207	Difference in Mean	0.021	-0.00060	-0.00015	Difference in Mean	-0.00045
	Median	0.454	0.527	Difference in Median	-0.073	-0.00087	-0.00030	Difference in Median	-0.00057
	Std. dev.	2.168	2.045	t-stat	0.317	0.00318	0.00339	t-stat	-4.613 ***
	n	1,081	156,958	Wilcoxon	-1.400	1,081	156,958	Wilcoxon	-7.298 ***
<b>10KQ</b>	Mean	1.156	1.207	Difference in Mean	-0.051	-0.00043	-0.00015	Difference in Mean	-0.00028
	Median	0.518	0.527	Difference in Median	-0.009	-0.00053	-0.00030	Difference in Median	-0.00023
	Std. dev.	1.972	2.045	t-stat	-1.079	0.00284	0.00339	t-stat	-4.020 ***
	n	1,729	156,958	Wilcoxon	-0.848	1,729	156,958	Wilcoxon	-4.706 ***
<b>10KQ (BEFORE Y9C)</b>	Mean	1.126	1.207	Difference in Mean	-0.082	-0.00058	-0.00015	Difference in Mean	-0.00042
	Median	0.559	0.527	Difference in Median	0.032	-0.00042	-0.00030	Difference in Median	-0.00013
	Std. dev.	1.727	2.045	t-stat	-1.033	0.00283	0.00339	t-stat	-3.265 ***
	n	480	156,958	Wilcoxon	0.186	480	156,958	Wilcoxon	0.026

\*\*\*, \*\*, \* denote significantly different from zero at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively (one-tailed if sign is in the predicted direction, two-tailed otherwise). T-tests (Wilcoxon signed-rank tests) are used for assessing means (medians). See Appendix for variable descriptions.

**TABLE 4**  
**Disclosure Date Regression Analysis**

	Predicted	RET				VOL			
Intercept	?	1.1762	***	1.1798	***	-0.0002	***	-0.0002	***
		0.0183		0.0184		0.0000		0.0000	
EA	+	2.2648	***			0.0018	***		
		0.1294				0.0002			
EA1	+			2.3532	***			0.0018	***
				0.1370				0.0002	
EA2	+			1.3975	***			0.0001	
				0.2833				0.0002	
EA_EXPANDED	+	0.8820	***	0.8784	***	0.0008	***	0.0008	***
		0.0609		0.0609		0.0001		0.0001	
CALL	+	0.2484	**			0.0002	**		
		0.1231				0.0001			
CALL1	+			0.2024	***			-0.0002	
				0.0804				0.0002	
CALL2	+			0.2578	**			0.0003	***
				0.1391				0.0001	
Y9C	+	-0.0172		-0.0208		-0.0002		-0.0002	
		0.0956		0.0956		0.0002		0.0002	
10KQ	+	-0.0205		-0.0240		-0.0002	**	-0.0003	**
		0.0555		0.0555		0.0001		0.0001	
Adjusted R-square		1.89%		1.76%		0.49%		0.45%	
n		164,821		164,821		164,821		164,821	

An F-test indicates that the estimated coefficient on EA1 is statistically higher than the estimated coefficient on EA2 in the second and fourth regression (one-tailed  $p = 0.001$ ). An F-test indicates that the estimated coefficient on CALL1 is not statistically different from the estimated coefficient on CALL2 in the second regression (one-tailed  $p = 0.733$ ) but is statistically lower in the fourth regression (two-tailed  $p = 0.07$ ).

\*\*\*, \*\*, \* denote significantly different from zero at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively (one-tailed if sign is in the predicted direction, two-tailed otherwise). The model is estimated using ordinary least squares. Robust standard errors clustered by date are presented below coefficient estimates. See Appendix for variable descriptions.

**TABLE 5**  
**Spillover Effects of the Call Report**

	Predicted	RET		VOL	
Intercept	?	1.1767	***	-0.0002	***
		0.0188		0.0000	
EA	+	2.2624	***	0.0019	***
		0.1291		0.0001	
EA_EXPANDED	+	0.8861	***	0.0010	***
		0.0596		0.0001	
DAY25	+	-0.0245		-0.0004	*
		0.1310		0.0003	
DAY26	+	0.0878		-0.0006	**
		0.1202		0.0003	
DAY27	+	0.0301		-0.0007	**
		0.0891		0.0003	
DAY28	+	-0.0691		-0.0005	*
		0.0746		0.0003	
DAY29	+	-0.0920		-0.0003	
		0.0865		0.0003	
CALL_30	+	0.2647	*	0.0002	*
		0.1917		0.0001	
CALL_NON30	+	0.2362	**	0.0003	**
		0.1069		0.0002	
DAY30_PRE	+	0.5488		-0.0002	
		0.4406		0.0003	
DAY30_POST	+	-0.1588		-0.0004	
		0.2377		0.0005	
Y9C	?	-0.0195		-0.0002	
		0.0956		0.0002	
10KQ	?	-0.0206		-0.0003	
		0.0555		0.0001	
Adjusted R-square		5.55%		0.58%	
n		164,821		164,821	

\*\*\*, \*\*, \* denote significantly different from zero at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively (one-tailed if sign is in the predicted direction, two-tailed otherwise). The model is estimated using ordinary least squares. Robust standard errors clustered by date are presented below coefficient estimates. See Appendix for variable descriptions.



**TABLE 6**  
**Factors that Influence the Information Content of the Call Report**

*Panel A: Cross-Sectional Determinants of Information Content based on Returns*

	Predicted	LogASSETS		LOW_CR		LTGAP		LOSS		ΔE		ΔLL		ΔCHRG OFF	
Intercept	?	1.4134	***	1.1759	***	1.1595	***	1.1758	***	1.1702		1.1879	***	1.1851	
		0.0510		0.0183		0.0204		0.0190		0.0191		0.0201		0.0193	
EA 1	+	-2.2042	***	2.2790	***	2.3523	***	2.3531	***	2.3574	***	2.4113	***	2.3711	***
		0.6314		0.1365		0.1666		0.1399		0.1394		0.1814		0.1426	
EA2	+	-6.8473	***	1.2172	***	1.4528	***	1.4636	***	1.3402	***	1.3786	***	1.5254	***
		2.5631		0.3040		0.3432		0.3043		0.3002		0.3040		0.3437	
EA_EXPANDED	+	0.8911	***	0.8785	***	0.8826	***	0.8806	***	0.8763	***	0.8793	***	0.8791	***
		0.0612		0.0609		0.0609		0.0610		0.0614		0.0612		0.0613	
CALL1	+	-0.4409		0.2330	***	0.2330	***	0.1918	**	0.1323	*	0.1996	***	0.1649	**
		0.4062		0.0883		0.0787		0.0894		0.0870		0.0834		0.0992	
CALL2	+	1.0177	***	0.2620	*	0.1459		0.2848	**	0.2684	**	0.3124	**	0.2638	**
		0.3535		0.1448		0.1561		0.1416		0.1429		0.1565		0.1454	
Z	?	-0.0289	***	0.0387	**	0.4098	***	0.0627	**	0.1058	***	-8.4377	***	-4.7145	***
		0.0068		0.0175		0.1055		0.0272		0.0367		2.8817		1.3651	
EA1_Z	?	0.5415	***	0.7764	*	0.1173		0.0742		0.0962		-56.7433		-14.3456	
		0.0792		0.4605		2.0657		0.5616		0.5584		99.6868		27.0401	
EA2_Z	?	1.1470	***	1.6555		-0.9989		-1.0158	**	0.7220		17.9503		-64.4587	
		0.3669		1.1387		1.9587		0.4489		0.9051		49.4867		60.7849	
CALL1_Z	?	0.0861		-0.2858		-0.5806		0.1617		1.1095	*	7.6723		24.1948	
		0.0556		0.2444		0.7893		0.3090		0.5796		5.9973		29.3230	
CALL2_Z	?/+/?/+/?/+/?/+/?/+/?/+	-0.0889	***	-0.0423		2.8817	*	-0.8385	***	-0.2598		-58.2209	**	-7.9524	
		0.0319		0.2123		2.0134		0.1465		0.2792		33.1143		10.1031	
Y9C	+	-0.0190		-0.0210		-0.0212		-0.0210		-0.0150		-0.0184		-0.0178	
		0.0958		0.0956		0.0960		0.0957		0.0980		0.0958		0.0959	
10KQ	+	-0.0237		-0.0241		-0.0230		-0.0233		-0.0114		-0.0221		-0.0223	
		0.0552		0.0555		0.0557		0.0556		0.0565		0.0555		0.0557	
Adjusted R-square		2.02%		1.78%		1.78%		1.77%		1.79%		1.78%		1.78%	
n		164,821		164,821		164,821		164,821		161,066		164,324		164,142	

Panel B: Cross-Sectional Determinants of Information Content based on Volume

	Predicted	LogASSETS	LOW_CR	LTGAP	LOSS	$\Delta E$	$\Delta L$	$\Delta \text{CHRG OFF}$
Intercept	?	0.0006 *** 0.0002	-0.0002 *** 0.0000	-0.0002 *** 0.0000	-0.0002 *** 0.0000	-0.0002 *** 0.0000	-0.0002 *** 0.0000	-0.0002 *** 0.0000
EA1	+	-0.0081 *** 0.0007	0.0017 *** 0.0002	0.0015 *** 0.0002	0.0018 *** 0.0002	0.0019 *** 0.0002	0.0018 *** 0.0002	0.0019 *** 0.0002
EA2	+	-0.0061 *** 0.0015	0.0001 *** 0.0002	0.0001 *** 0.0002	0.0000 *** 0.0002	0.0000 *** 0.0002	-0.0001 *** 0.0002	0.0003 *** 0.0002
EA_EXPANDED	+	0.0008 *** 0.0001	0.0008 *** 0.0001	0.0008 *** 0.0001	0.0008 *** 0.0001	0.0008 *** 0.0001	0.0008 *** 0.0001	0.0008 *** 0.0001
CALL1	+	0.0008 *** 0.0009	-0.0003 * 0.0002	-0.0005 ** 0.0002	-0.0002 *** 0.0002	-0.0004 * 0.0002	-0.0003 * 0.0002	-0.0003 *** 0.0002
CALL2	+	0.0005 *** 0.0004	0.0003 *** 0.0001	0.0002 * 0.0002	0.0003 *** 0.0001	0.0003 *** 0.0001	0.0004 *** 0.0001	0.0003 *** 0.0001
Z	?	-0.0001 *** 0.0000	-0.0001 *** 0.0000	-0.0003 *** 0.0003	-0.0001 * 0.0000	0.0001 * 0.0001	-0.0111 * 0.0057	-0.0075 *** 0.0030
EA1_Z	?	0.0012 *** 0.0001	0.0016 *** 0.0005	0.0091 *** 0.0033	0.0019 * 0.0010	0.0006 * 0.0016	0.0761 0.0912	-0.0218 0.0305
EA2_Z	?	0.0009 *** 0.0002	-0.0001 *** 0.0005	0.0007 * 0.0016	0.0017 *** 0.0005	0.0007 * 0.0006	0.1113 ** 0.0492	-0.0755 *** 0.0319
CALL1_Z	?	-0.0002 *** 0.0001	0.0008 * 0.0005	0.0042 *** 0.0014	0.0003 *** 0.0009	0.0029 *** 0.0006	0.0214 *** 0.0178	0.0147 0.0531
CALL2_Z	?/+/?/+/?/+/?/+/?/+	0.0000 0.0000	0.0003 * 0.0002	0.0028 * 0.0019	-0.0002 * 0.0003	0.0002 0.0006	-0.0307 0.0516	0.0190 0.0241
Y9C	+	-0.0002 0.0002	-0.0002 0.0002	-0.0002 0.0002	-0.0002 0.0002	-0.0002 0.0002	-0.0002 0.0002	-0.0002 0.0002
10KQ	+	-0.0003 *** 0.0001	-0.0003 ** 0.0001	-0.0003 ** 0.0001	-0.0003 ** 0.0001	-0.0003 ** 0.0001	-0.0003 ** 0.0001	-0.0003 ** 0.0001
Adjusted R-square		1.00%	0.48%	0.48%	0.47%	0.47%	0.46%	0.46%
n		164,821	164,821	164,821	164,821	161,066	164,324	164,142

\*\*\*, \*\*, \* denote significantly different from zero at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively (one-tailed if sign is in the predicted direction, two-tailed otherwise). The model is estimated using ordinary least squares. Robust standard errors clustered by date are presented below coefficient estimates. See Appendix for variable descriptions.

**TABLE 7**  
**Assumed Day 30 Analysis**

	Predicted	RET				VOL			
Intercept	?	1.1788	***	1.1824	***	-0.0002	***	-0.0002	***
		0.0186		0.0186		0.0000		0.0000	
EA	+	2.2023	***			0.0017	***		
		0.1275				0.0002			
EA1	+			2.2144	***			0.0017	***
				0.1288				0.0002	
EA2	+			1.3221	***			0.0002	
				0.3517				0.0002	
EA_EXPANDED	+	0.8788	***	0.8752	***	0.0008	***	0.0008	***
		0.0611		0.0610		0.0001		0.0001	
A_CALL	+	0.2877	*			0.0003	**		
		0.1987				0.0001			
A_CALL1	+			0.1340				0.0000	
				0.1701				0.0002	
A_CALL2	+			0.3095	*			0.0004	***
				0.2113				0.0001	
A_Y9C	+	-0.2386	***	-0.2421	***	-0.0002		-0.0002	
		0.0592		0.0592		0.0003		0.0003	
10KQ	+	0.0083		0.0047		-0.0003	***	-0.0004	***
		0.0683		0.0684		0.0001		0.0001	
Adjusted R-square		1.92%		1.77%		0.50%		0.46%	
n		164,986		164,986		164,986		164,986	

An F-test indicates that the estimated coefficient on EA1 is statistically higher than the estimated coefficient on EA2 in the second and fourth regression (one-tailed  $p = 0.001$ ). An F-test indicates that the estimated coefficient on CALL1 is not statistically different from the estimated coefficient on CALL2 in the second and fourth regression (one-tailed  $p = 0.348, 0.162$ , respectively).

\*\*\*, \*\*, \* denote significantly different from zero at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively (one-tailed if sign is in the predicted direction, two-tailed otherwise). The model is estimated using ordinary least squares. Robust standard errors clustered by date are presented below coefficient estimates. See Appendix for variable descriptions.

**TABLE 8**  
**Information Content Analysis by Year**

*Panel A: Returns*

	Predicted	RET														
		2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	
Intercept	?	1.4318 ***	1.0429 ***	1.3927 ***	1.1091 ***	1.2266 ***	1.3774 ***	1.2261 ***	1.9748 ***	1.7749 ***	1.1665 ***	1.2635 ***	1.4228 ***	1.0856 ***	1.2313 ***	
EA	+	0.0414	0.0379	0.0421	0.0199	0.0177	0.0246	0.0303	0.0860	0.0823	0.0344	0.0265	0.0523	0.0213	0.0302	
EA_EXPANDED	+	0.1854 **	0.3793 ***	0.8732 ***	0.6405 ***	0.9522 ***	1.8308 ***	1.5379 ***	1.7156 ***	1.7512 ***	1.2971 ***	2.0176 ***	1.4659 ***	1.9967 ***	1.9817 ***	
A_CALL	+	0.1073	0.1114	0.1316	0.1004	0.0806	0.1439	0.1312	0.1826	0.3579	0.1633	0.1482	0.1569	0.1610	0.1493	
A_Y9C	+	0.0508	0.0580	0.3650 ***	0.2393 ***	0.4811 ***	0.7511 ***	0.4653 ***	0.2808 ***	0.4225 ***	0.4353 ***	0.6003 ***	0.1389 **	0.6132 ***	0.6485 ***	
10KQ	+	0.0698 ***	0.0664	0.1362	0.0469	0.0530	0.0709	0.0673	0.1156	0.1524	0.0805 **	0.0743	0.0756 ***	0.0558	0.0711	
Adjusted R-square		0.0255	-0.2304 ***	-0.2009	-0.0239	-0.0246	0.1255	0.3089 *	-0.2482	-0.3752 **	0.0437	0.3165 **	0.0088	0.1806 *	0.3648 *	
n		0.2633	0.0797	0.1741	0.1060 ***	0.0740	0.1173	0.2093	0.2673	0.1618	0.2303	0.1367	0.1029	0.1201	0.2439	
		-0.1627	-0.4528 ***	-0.2645	0.0123	0.0861	-0.1861	0.0759	0.9870	-0.5967 ***	0.0866	0.2189	0.7895	-0.1949 **	-0.2931 ***	
		0.1143	0.0788	0.2087	0.1266	0.1037	0.1473	0.0904	0.9401	0.2286	0.2900	0.4540	1.1562	0.0856	0.0877	
		0.1491	-0.1196	0.0053	-0.0076	0.1430 **	0.1462	-0.1952 **	0.4966 *	-0.3148 ***	0.3609 ***	-0.0397	-0.0355	0.0276	-0.0508	
		0.1955	0.0967	0.1061	0.0802	0.0805	0.1755	0.0845	0.3451	0.1218	0.1239	0.0836	0.2150	0.1014	0.0995	
Adjusted R-square		0.02%	0.19%	0.40%	0.26%	0.56%	1.28%	0.96%	0.43%	0.49%	0.55%	1.28%	0.55%	1.75%	1.55%	
n		79,572	76,974	83,863	89,991	93,088	96,491	97,041	95,004	92,359	93,754	91,552	87,568	84,533	80,495	

*Panel B: Volume*

	Predicted	VOL														
		2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	
Intercept	?	-0.0001 ***	0.0002 ***	-0.0003 ***	0.0000	-0.0003 ***	-0.0003 ***	-0.0003 ***	-0.0013 ***	-0.0005	-0.0009	-0.0011 ***	-0.0007 ***	0.0007 ***	0.0004 ***	
EA	+	0.0000	0.0001	0.0001	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0001	0.0004	0.0010	0.0003	0.0002	0.0002	0.0001	
EA_EXPANDED	+	0.0002 **	0.0002 **	-0.0002	0.0001	0.0000	0.0003 ***	0.0005 ***	0.0010 ***	0.0002	0.0002	-0.0002	0.0017 ***	0.0007 ***	0.0011 ***	
A_CALL	+	0.0001	0.0001	0.0002	0.0001	0.0001	0.0001	0.0001	0.0003	0.0008	0.0015	0.0006	0.0003	0.0003	0.0002	
A_Y9C	+	0.0003 ***	0.0003 ***	-0.0003 **	0.0000	0.0000	0.0002 ***	0.0002 **	0.0004 **	0.0010 **	-0.0003	0.0012 ***	0.0007 ***	0.0009 ***	0.0009 ***	
10KQ	+	0.0001	0.0001	0.0002	0.0001	0.0001	0.0001	0.0001	0.0002	0.0006	0.0013	0.0005	0.0002	0.0003	0.0001	
Adjusted R-square		0.0002	0.0001	-0.0005	-0.0001	0.0001	-0.0001	0.0000	0.0007 *	0.0004	0.0003	0.0031 ***	0.0009	0.0024 ***	0.0009 *	
n		0.0003	0.0002	0.0006	0.0001	0.0001	0.0002	0.0001	0.0005	0.0018	0.0064	0.0013	0.0008	0.0009	0.0005	
		0.0004 ***	0.0006 ***	0.0003	0.0002 *	-0.0001	0.0003 **	-0.0001	-0.0008	0.0040 ***	0.0018	-0.0003	-0.0008	-0.0004	0.0009 ***	
		0.0002	0.0003	0.0005	0.0002	0.0005	0.0002	0.0002	0.0013	0.0017	0.0063	0.0027	0.0030	0.0015	0.0003	
		0.0002 *	0.0003 **	0.0001	0.0002 **	0.0002 **	0.0001	0.0000	-0.0006 *	0.0004	-0.0129 ***	0.0006	0.0005	-0.0006	-0.0001	
		0.0002	0.0001	0.0003	0.0001	0.0001	0.0001	0.0001	0.0004	0.0013	0.0037	0.0009	0.0007	0.0006	0.0002	
Adjusted R-square		0.15%	0.24%	0.24%	0.05%	0.02%	0.12%	0.11%	0.35%	0.36%	0.47%	0.31%	0.55%	0.72%	0.96%	
n		79,572	76,974	83,863	89,991	93,088	96,491	97,041	95,004	92,359	93,754	91,552	87,568	84,533	80,495	

\*\*\*, \*\*, \* denote significantly different from zero at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively (one-tailed if sign is in the predicted direction, two-tailed otherwise). The model is estimated using ordinary least squares. Robust standard errors clustered by date are presented below coefficient estimates. See Appendix for variable descriptions.