Jieqiong (Cicy) Jin

Oct 2023

Department of Economics Daniels School of Business Purdue University 403 Mitch Daniels Blvd, West Lafayette, IN 47907

EDUCATION

Purdue University

- M.S. in Economics
- *Ph.D. Candidate in Economics* Committee: Tim Cason (Chair), Yaroslav Rosokha, Colin Sullivan
- University of Amsterdam

• M.S. in Economics

• B.S. in Economics and Business

RESEARCH INTERESTS

West Lafayette, IN 2019 2018 - 2024 (expected)

Amsterdam, Netherlands

Phone: (765) 409-9573

Email: jin334@purdue.edu

Website: https://jiegiong-jin.com

LinkedIn: linkedin.com/in/jieqiong-jin

2016 - 2017 2013 - 2016

Behavioral Economics, Experimental Economics, Public Economics, Applied Microeconomics

WORKING PAPERS

[1] Behavioral Spillover in Cooperation Games (Job Market Paper)

Abstract: In daily life, people interact with members from different groups in similar strategic settings. Sometimes the interaction involves a whole group while sometimes only one individual. Previous literature has established that spillover effect exists when multiple games are played simultaneously, whether facing the same partner(s) or not. This study experimentally investigates behavioral spillovers between two social dilemma type games. In our experiments, subjects play Prisoner's Dilemma game (PD) and Public Goods game (PGG) simultaneously where the opponents of the two games do not overlap. We vary the basin of attraction to defect in PD game and test how this would affect subject's contributing behavior in PGG, which stays the same across treatments. We find that behavioral spillover exists in our setting and comes in an asymmetric form. When people are in an environment where cooperation is easy to sustain in the PD game, the PGG contribution would not increase much, comparing to the baseline treatment when the PGG is played alone. However, when they are in the setting where cooperation is hard to sustain in the PD game, their PGG contribution would decrease significantly.

[2] The Effect of Private Judgement System on Cooperation: An Experimental Test

Abstract: Cooperation is difficult to achieve among agents who are confronted with a social dilemma but cannot identify each other or effectively build reputations. In large communities, it is neither feasible for an agent to retrieve the complete history of his/her current partner nor possible to enforce cooperation by punishing the partner immediately, especially when the frequency of interaction is rather rare. This study examines cooperation and the impact of bribery in an extended version of indefinitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma, the Law Merchant system stage game, by experimentally testing the model proposed by Milgrom et al. (1990). According to theory, the presence of a disinterested third party that could both keep records and adjudicate disputes would increase the level of cooperation within the community. However, when this third party is prone to bribery, the community will cooperate less when no such institution is present. This study contributes to the literature on bribery experiments by studying bribery's impact on the overall level of cooperation in markets and constraining a community network for the potential

bribe-givers. Main results of this study: 1) With the presence of the third party, whether bribery is possible, the cooperation has a decreasing trend; 2) The possibility of the third-party requesting bribery will decrease cooperation.

CONFERENCE TALKS

Ostrom-Smith Conference, Bloomington/IU, IN ESA North-American Meeting, Santa Barbara/UCSB, CA ESA World Meeting, Boston, MA Ostrom-Smith Conference, West Lafayette/Purdue, IN ESA North American Regional Meeting, Tucson, AZ

HONORS & AWARDS

Krannert Doctoral Student Research Fund Awards (\$3K, \$4K, \$4k) Krannert Certificate for Outstanding Teaching for Econ 251 Krannert Certificate for Outstanding Recitation Teaching for Econ 210

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

Strategic Partnerships Intern Zhejiang Intellectual Property Exchange Center

- Played a key role in enabling local investors to comprehensively evaluate project details by ensuring accurate and culturally appropriate translations.
- Collaborated with a diverse team to support department's objectives, showcasing teamwork and crosscultural communication skills.

TEACHING & RESEARCH EXPERIENCE

Instructors

Purdue University Online TA Instructor: Microeconomics (Econ 251) Recitation Instructor: Principles of Economics (Econ 210)

Research Assistants

Purdue University Cathy Zhang | oTree programming, Robustness check in Stata Colin Sullivan | Data analysis in R Tim Cason | oTree programming, Chats coding Farid Farrokhi | Data analysis in Stata Collin Raymond | Qualtrics, Experimental session assistance

University of Amsterdam Simin He | Experimental session assistance, Chats coding

Teaching Assistants

Purdue University

Macroeconomic Theory II (ECON 611, PhD) Behavioral Economics (ECON 585, Masters, Online) Intermediate Macroeconomics (ECON 352, Undergraduate) International Economics (ECON 590, Masters, Online) International Economics (ECON 466, Undergraduate) Mathematical Analysis for Economists (ECON 615, PhD) Intermediate Microeconomics (ECON 511, Masters, Online) West Lafayette, IN Summer 2020

Fall 2018

West Lafayette, IN

Fall 2021- Present Spring 2023 – Summer 2023 Fall 2021 – Fall 2022 Fall 2020 Fall 2020, Spring 2021

Amsterdam, Netherlands

Spring 2016

West Lafayette, IN

Spring 2022, Spring 2023 Spring 2022 Fall 2021, Fall 2022 Summer 2021 Spring 2021 Fall 2019 Fall 2019, Spring 2020

2021, 2022, 2023 Summer 2020 Fall 2020

Jan 2018 – May 2018

Hangzhou, China

Spring 2023

Summer 2022

Fall2022

Fall 2021

Fall 2021

SKILLS

Stata | R | Python | MATLAB | SQL | oTree | HTML | JavaScript

CERTIFICATIONS

Python Data Structures, Coursera

REFERENCES

Tim Cason Professor Purdue University cason@purdue.edu Yaroslav Rosokha Associate Professor Purdue University yrosokha@purdue.edu

Colin Sullivan Assistant Professor

Purdue University cdsulliv@gmail.com

Spring 2019 Fall 2018 – Fall 2019 Fall 2018

2023