Motivating Devoted Workers

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December 3, 2003

Abstract

When increased effort by a worker induces an employer to reduce its use of other inputs, inefficiency may result. In particular, suppose that output increases with the worker’s effort, that a worker exerts extra effort because he values the output produced beyond the wage he earns, that output increases with the capital the employer provides, and that these levels are not verifiable. Under plausible conditions output is lower if the employer can commit to a level of capital than if it cannot. If the employer cannot commit, then output may decline as the worker values the output more. When the employer pays the worker for increased output, output may be lower when the worker values it than when he does not. Lastly, efficiency may increase when a firm is paid more for a unit of output than its marginal social value, and when the employer can commit to using a given level of other inputs.

Keywords: Contracts, Organization of production, Privatization

JEL Classification Codes: L14, L23, L33

*I am grateful for the suggestions made by the referees and editor.
Workers commonly care about the wages they earn, but not about what the firm produces—a person will prefer working in a widget factory over working in a car factory only if he earns a higher wage or enjoys better working conditions.

Yet some workers take pride in their work, caring deeply about what they produce. The brave performance of New York City firemen and policemen after the September 11 attacks shows that these people were concerned about what they accomplished. University professors often take such pride in their research that they devote effort that exceeds what could be explained by income maximization. Heckman, Smith and Taber (1996) provide statistical evidence that some governmental workers care about outcomes. They investigate training centers under the Job Training Partnership Act, which received monetary rewards based on the employment levels and wage rates attained by the program’s graduates. This creates an incentive for the manager to ‘cream-skim’ the most employable of the applicants into the program. But the authors find that people with lower expected earnings are more likely to be accepted into the program, contradicting the cream-skimming prediction. Instead, it appears that these bureaucrats preferred helping the disadvantaged over earning more money.

Such behavior is consistent with the results of survey responses. A survey in Britain finds that workers in the not-for-profit and public sectors considered money the least important reason for their choice of jobs, with just nine percent citing it as a key motivator. Almost half said believing in their jobs was the top motivator.¹ In a 1977 survey in the United States, half of the respondents agreed that “what I do at work is more important to me than

¹The survey results was reported by BBC News, May 19, 2003.
the money I earn.” Over ninety percent stated that they put in more effort into their job than required (Quinn and Staines (1979)).

In theoretical work, Dixit (2000) notes that organizations with idealistic or ethical purposes may attract workers who share these goals. Delfgaauw and Dur (2002) model workers who like to exert effort at the workplace, examining optimal monetary incentive schemes, a worker’s effort in equilibrium, and a job seeker’s incentives to reveal his motivation.

A good which benefits people besides the direct consumers is often a public good, and since I assume that increased output benefits both the employer and the worker, the output may be a public good. Note, however, that for my purposes the good may in other ways be a private one (for example, as with health care, use by final consumers is rivalrous).

I shall say that the utility a worker enjoys from increased production of a good, beyond the pay he receives, arises from “devotion” to his job. Some examples of devoted workers appear in jobs related to public safety, such as soldiers, policemen, and firefighters. But the concept is more general. A nurse who cares about the health of patients, or a university professor who takes pride in writing a great book, may also value the output they produce.

The issues addressed here center on the behavior of employers who anticipate the devoted effort of their workers, and on the behavior of workers when they anticipate that increased effort can induce the employer to reduce its spending on inputs. We shall see that mechanisms which commit an employer to provide a minimum level of input can increase efficiency, and that therefore government may more efficiently produce some goods.
1 Literature

My assumption that a worker cares about the output, and that he can increase its provision, relates to the private provision of public goods. And my focus on how increased effort by a worker can cause the employer to reduce the resources it allocates to production relates to crowding out in the private provision of public goods. A large literature finds that, in theory, crowding out can be large, or even complete. Relatedly, analyses of the Good Samaritan Paradox (see Bruce and Waldman (1990) and Lindbeck and Weibull (1988)) show that recipients of altruistic benefits who anticipate the gifts may act in ways which lower the welfare of the altruists, and negate the benefits of their gifts.

Several papers on the private provision of public goods consider, as I do, production. Steinberg (1989, p. 146) suggests that complementarity of private donations and governmental contributions may lead to incomplete crowding out. Andreoni (1998) considers increasing returns at low levels of the public good, so that a small contribution can elicit increased contributions.

In comparing Stackelberg to Nash solutions, or in comparing solutions with and without commitment by the employer, I build on Varian (1994) who shows that if both parties care only about total output and if one party can commit first, total contributions will be smaller than in the simultaneous move game. Romano and Yildirim (2001) show that with more general utility functions (which allow, for example, for warm-glow or snob appeal) a charity may increase total contributions by announcing them sequentially.

Holmstrom (1982) studies a firm in which output increases with the joint
effort of the workers. Though he does not refer to the workers as privately providing a public good, he does emphasize the free-riding problem, and describes a contract which can achieve efficiency. A similar problem is considered by Congleton (1991), where the complementarity between different inputs means that the Nash equilibrium can be inefficient. Since Holmstrom and Congleton assume workers care only about income, not output, they do not address the effects I consider. Congleton (2002) considers a government which purposely gives discretion to officials, because it knows that some officials care about the policies they implement, and that by giving them greater discretion it can attract more talented people. Besley and Ghatak (2003) also model workers who care about the organization’s achievements; the focus of their model is on matching the preferences of principals and agents. Francois (2000) models a public service motivation which induces employees to provide effort out of concern for the impact of that effort on a valued social service. In Francois (2003) the worker chooses effort, and then the manager sets managerial effort which is a perfect substitute for worker effort. The assumption that for the owner of a private firm utility increases with both profits and output, whereas the manager of a non-profit cares only about output, leads to the result that a for-profit manager will work more than would a non-profit manager, and so lead to more shirking by the worker. My focus is not on the different motivations between for-profit and non-profit organizations, but on differences in their abilities to commit.

The literature on non-profits sometimes mentions motivated workers; see, for example, Weisbrod (1988, p. 31-33) and Glaeser (2002). Hart and Holmstrom (2002) and Mailath, Nocke and Postlewaite (2002) allow for the possibility that agents are moved by non-pecuniary benefits of their actions.
2 Assumptions

A good is produced using an input provided by the employer, and an input provided by the worker. For simplicity, I call the employer’s input capital, indicated by $K$. But the input can be far more general, including, for example, the amount of labor the employer hires in addition to the worker under consideration.

A worker’s input consists of two parts. First, an employer can ensure that the worker provides at least the level $x$. Second, the worker can provide effort, $x$, which the employer cannot directly observe or verify. I call this unverified effort. For the moment, suppose the worker is not paid for unverified effort, though this assumption is relaxed in Section 3.3. The cost to a worker of unverified effort $x$ is $C(x)$.

The employer (which can be government, a non-profit organization, or a private firm) values each unit of output at $p$. The valuation can reflect the price at which the employer sells a unit of output, the marginal benefit to a manager of a subsidiary from increasing output, the preferences of government when it is the producer, and so on. A devoted worker values each unit of output at $V > 0$, which can be less than or more than $p$. Later on, I will generalize by allowing the marginal valuation of output to decline with its level.

The firm hires one worker. I begin by assuming an exogenous wage, $w$, and later consider a wage which varies with output. When the wage is fixed,

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2Since the employer is paid for output, I implicitly assume that output is verifiable. For effort to remain unverified, I must therefore also assume that provision of capital is unverifiable. Intuitively, the firm may claim that high output results from its provision of much capital, while the worker may claim that it results from his high effort. An outside court or arbitrator cannot tell which is true.
it can be ignored in the maximization problems discussed below.

We can also view the wage not as exogenous, but as set before the firm chooses capital or the worker chooses effort, but with each actor having rational expectations of the choices the other actor will make. For example, the equilibrium wage may be higher when potential workers anticipate that the firm will provide little capital. But the firm sets capital after the wage is set, and so views the wage as a parameter when deciding on capital.

Each unit of capital costs $r$. The amount of capital is $K$, and output is $Q = F(K, x)$. The employer maximizes $pQ - rK = pF(K, x) - rK$; its choice variable is $K$. The worker maximizes $VF(K, x) - C(x)$; his choice variable is $x$.

3 Results

Critical to the analysis is consideration of how a worker’s choice of $x$ varies with $K$, and of how an employer’s choice of $K$ varies with $x$. The first-order condition for the firm is $pF_K(K, x) = r$, yielding $F_{KK}(dK/dx) + F_{Kx} = 0$, so that $dK/dx = -F_{Kx}/F_{KK}$. Diminishing marginal product would make $F_{KK}$ negative. But the sign of $F_{Kx}$ is ambiguous. If the two inputs are substitutes, then $F_{Kx} < 0$. But if the inputs are complements the sign will be positive. Therefore $dK/dx$ can be either positive or negative, and the firm’s reaction curve can slope upwards or downwards. Similarly, the worker’s reaction curve is derived from his first-order condition that $VF_x(K, x) = C'(x)$, yielding $dx/dK = VF_{xK}/(C'' - VF_{xx})$. This too can be positive or negative.
3.1 Upward sloping reaction functions

The simpler case to analyze has both reaction curves slope upward. The Nash equilibrium must satisfy the first-order conditions for the worker and for the employer, namely $x$ and $K$ must simultaneously satisfy $pF_K(K, x) = r$ and $VF_x(K, x) = C'(x)$. The equilibrium is stable if the worker’s reaction function is steeper than the employer’s reaction function. This is shown in Figure 1.\footnote{Such a stable solution is consistent with even simple production and cost functions. For example, let $Q = (\gamma + K)^\alpha(\pi + x)^\beta$, where $\gamma, \pi, \alpha,$ and $\beta$ are parameters. Let a worker’s cost of effort $x$ be $cx$. Then the Nash equilibrium is stable for a wide range of parameter values, including $V = 2, p = 1, r = c = 1$, and $\alpha = \beta = 0.4$.}

If the worker places no value on output, $x = 0$, and the Nash equilibrium lies at the point where the employer’s reaction function, $EE$, intersects the vertical axis. When the worker does value output, the Nash equilibrium is at $N$, where the employer’s reaction function intersects the worker’s reaction function. And since the employer’s reaction function $(EE)$ slopes upward, point $N$ shows greater use of both inputs, and greater output, than the Nash equilibrium when the worker does not value output.

Consider next the Stackelberg solution. That is, the firm chooses $K$ to maximize $pF(K, x) - rK$ subject to the worker maximizing his utility, or subject to $x$ satisfying $VF_x(K, x) = C'(x)$. To determine that solution, it is useful to depict the employer’s iso-utility (or for a firm, iso-profit) curves. An iso-utility curve is shown as curve $PP$. To see the shape, consider a given level of $x$, say $x_1$. Then the employer may enjoy the same utility for both a high level of $K$ and a low level of $K$. Starting at a low $K$, an increase in $K$ may be highly productive, and so utility is kept constant only if an increase in $K$ is associated with a decrease in $x$; this is the negatively sloped part of
the curve. But at high $K$, the marginal product of $K$ will be low, so that
an increase in $K$ increases costs but little increases output, thereby reducing
utility. To keep utility constant, $x$ must increase; this is represented by the
positively sloped section of the iso-utility curve. Note also that movements
to the right increase the employer’s utility—for a constant $K$, an increase
in $x$ increases output. And note that the employer’s reaction curve can be
derived by the points on each iso-utility curve where the tangent is vertical:
at such a point, the employer maximizes utility for a given $x$.

The employer maximizes profits or utility by choosing the point on the
worker’s reaction function ($WW$) which is tangent to one of the employer’s
iso-utility curves, as at point $S$. Since at point $N$ the tangent to the em-
ployer’s iso-utility curve is vertical, point $S$ must lie to the right of $N$. And
since $WW$ slopes upward, at $S$ both $x$ and $K$ exceed $N$. Output in the
Stackelberg solution thus exceeds output in the Nash solution.

A Stackelberg solution can arise if the employer commits to a fixed level
of $K$, or if it lacks the flexibility to adjust $K$ in response to the worker’s un-
verified effort. As one application, if government wishes to provide the good,
and governmental agencies are less flexible than private firms, then produc-
tion by the agency can lead to a Stackelberg solution, whereas provision by
a private firm which is paid by government would not. Government would
therefore prefer to produce the good directly. Moreover, devoted workers may
prefer to work for an employer that will produce more, and so will prefer a
governmental job.
3.2 Downward sloping reaction functions

More interesting results appear when the reaction functions slope down: an increase in the worker’s effort reduces the employer’s allocation of capital, and an increase in capital reduces the worker’s effort.\textsuperscript{4} This assumption also appears plausible. Other researchers find, for example, that computers substitute for labor. In the public sector, this is found by Brynjolfsson, Malone, and Gurbaxani (1988), and by Crowston, Melone, and Lin (1986). The effect appears strongest when the organization is centralized (Pinsonneault and Kraemer (1997)). In the private sector, too, the evidence shows that computers are labor are substitutes. Hitt and Snir (1999) find this in a sample of over 400 large firms, though here, as in the public sector, firms which decentralize decisions on computer use and purchase show less substitution. Chwelos, Ramirez and Kraemer (2003) study 1,624 firms over the period 1987-1999, finding that information-technology capital substitutes for labor.

The geometric solution is shown in Figure 2. The employer’s reaction function is $EE$; the worker’s reaction function is $WW$. Figure 2 also supposes that the worker’s reaction curve is steeper than the employer’s reaction curve, ensuring that the Nash equilibrium is stable. The Nash equilibrium is at point $N$, where the two reaction curves intersect.

3.2.1 Stackelberg solution

Now suppose that the employer can commit, making for a Stackelberg game. The Stackelberg leader should not be interpreted solely as the first mover. Rather, an employer plays a Stackelberg game if it cannot adjust capital after

\textsuperscript{4}A simple production function which generates such reaction functions is $Q = (K+x)^\alpha$, with $0 < \alpha < 1$. 
observing labor effort.

Some reasoning suggests that the public sector is slower to adjust its capital than is the private sector. Bozeman and Bretschneider (1986) claim that because mistakes in the public sector can have devastating consequences, such as retirees or welfare recipients not receiving checks they depend on for survival, or prison inmates being mistakenly paroled, managers of computer systems in the public sector will be more cautious in making changes than would be managers in the private sector. Bretschneider (1990) and Bretschneider and Wittmer (1993) look further into the differences between public and private organizations. Based on surveys of public and private data-processing organizations, they conclude that public organizations face greater interdependence and accountability, and hence more red tape and levels of scrutiny. In short, in the public sector capital may be slowly adjusted when workers increase effort. As a simplification we may therefore think that in the public sector the level of capital is fixed before a worker chooses his level of effort, or that the Stackelberg model more likely applies in the public sector than in the private sector.

The employer maximizes its utility by choosing that level of $K$ which makes his iso-utility curve tangent to the reaction curve of the worker. This is shown as point $S$. If the worker’s reaction curve slopes downward, this tangency necessarily lies to the right of point $N$, which represents the Nash equilibrium. When the employer can commit to $K$ it will choose a smaller $K$ than at a Nash equilibrium.\footnote{Since devoted workers prefer to work for firms that commit to a higher level of capital, devoted workers may prefer to work for such firms; selfish workers will work at firms that choose a lower level of capital. Thus, the equilibrium may have different types of firms, with competition between firms driving up the level of capital to the point where firms}
The employer who can commit to keep $K$ unchanged benefits (utility is higher at $S$ than at $N$) because given a low level of $K$, a worker has more incentive to increase effort when $K$ is fixed than when $K$ declines as the worker increases $x$.

I must still determine whether output is higher at $N$ than at $S$. To determine that, I introduce isoquants, showing values of $K$ and $x$ at which output is constant. Consider isoquant $II$ which goes through point $N$, the Nash equilibrium solution. As $K$ declines, the worker increases $x$; but if the worker’s marginal cost of effort increases with $x$, his increased effort will not suffice to keep output constant; instead output will decline. Therefore, to the right of point $N$, the isoquant lies above the worker’s reaction function, or to the right of $N$ curve $II$ lies above curve $WW$. Point $S$, the Stackelberg solution, therefore necessarily shows lower output than does the Nash equilibrium. One interpretation is that an employer who can commit to a level of capital will exploit the worker’s devotion by choosing a low level of capital that induces the worker to increase effort, but that reduces total output.

### 3.2.2 Value of output declines with its level

Similar results will apply if the value of the output is not constant, but rather declines with an increase in output. Such diminishing marginal value makes the reaction curves steeper. For example, if non-verifiable effort increases, then the firm little values additional output and so will reduce its allocation of capital by more than if it the value of output is constant. The firm’s iso-utility curve will also have the same general shape, but in its downward sloping section becomes flatter than when the value of output is a constant. are indifferent between attracting devoted or selfish workers.
As before, the employer will enjoy higher utility when he can commit to a level of capital than when he cannot.

In comparing outputs at $S$ and at $N$, it will continue to hold that if the firm reduces $K$, the worker will not increase $x$ to maintain output. Therefore, to the right of $N$, the isoquant $II$ lies above the worker’s reaction curve $WW$, and the Stackelberg solution necessarily shows lower output than does the Nash equilibrium.

### 3.2.3 How output varies with the worker’s devotion

I compare next the Nash and Stackelberg solutions with a worker who values output and a worker who does not. Thus, suppose $x$ is zero. Then the employer sets capital at $K_0$, where its reaction function intersects the vertical axis. To compare output at $N$ to output at $K_0$, notice that points $K_0$ and $N$ lie on the reaction function $EE$. Consider the isoquant that goes through point $K_0$. When the employer’s marginal cost of capital is a constant, and $x$ and $K$ are perfect substitutes, the isoquant coincides with the employer’s reaction curve: the employer would fully compensate for an increase in effort by reducing capital to maintain the same output. Under these conditions, points $N$ and $K_0$ show the same output, and point $S$ shows lower output than point $N$. Output may thus be lower when the worker values it.

Suppose in contrast that the employer faces an increasing marginal cost of $K$. Then the isoquant through point $K_0$, curve $K_0J$, lies below curve $EE$: the employer responds to an increase in the worker’s effort by reducing capital, but the reduction is sufficiently limited so that total output increased. Point $N$ would then lie on a higher isoquant than point $K_0$, and point $S$ could lie on a higher isoquant than point $K_0$. Output would then be higher when the
worker values it.

3.3 Pay that varies with output

I assumed so far that the worker’s pay is fixed, invariant with his effort or with output. One might object that if output is observable, then the employer can deduce the worker’s effort. So why not pay him a bonus when output is high? Surely, for example, if the firm pays anything less than $p$ for a marginal increase in output beyond the level that the worker would choose absent incentive pay, the firm would increase its profits.

Note first that if the levels of $x$ and of $K$ are unverifiable, the employer may effectively renege on paying the worker for increased effort: the employer may claim that the high output arose not from the worker’s efforts, but from its high spending on $K$. Some contractual provisions cannot be enforced.

Note also that incentive pay would change the worker’s reaction function, the employer’s reaction function, and the employer’s iso-utility curves. But if the reaction functions continue to slope downward, the qualitative results described above hold.

To consider further how devotion affects output under incentive pay, I shall continue to suppose that effort is unverifiable, but that output is verifiable, so that the worker’s pay increases with output.

In Figure 3, let the worker’s reaction curve when he does not value output be $WW$; let the employer’s reaction curve be $EE$. The Nash equilibrium is at $N$. For an illuminating case, let $K$ and $x$ be perfect substitutes, let production exhibit diminishing marginal product, and let the unit cost of $K$ be constant. Then the isoquant through $N$ is necessarily flatter than $EE$. The reason is that an employer who gave no incentive pay would have its
reaction function coincide with the isoquant: the employer would respond to an increase in $x$ by reducing $K$ to keep output constant. But if the worker’s pay increases with output, the employer would not want to keep output constant: by reducing output it would reduce its costs. Thus, $EE$ lies below isoquant $II$ to the right of $N$.

Now suppose that the worker values output. His reaction function shifts up, from $WW$ to $W'W'$. The new Nash equilibrium is at $N'$. If $EE$ slopes downward, then $N'$ necessarily lies to the right of $N$, and therefore represents lower output than $N$. That is, for a given pay system, output may be lower when the worker values it.

Of course, an employer with devoted workers will change its pay system, so that the reaction function is no longer $EE$. But we saw that without wage incentives, output may be lower when workers value it. So the combination of wage incentives and devotion can reduce output.

4 Contracts to overcome commitment problem

When workers care about output, two market imperfections arise. First is a standard externality—an increase in capital increases the utility of a devoted worker. The effects of this externality are conventional, and so to highlight other effects I ignore it. Second, when the worker values output, the Nash equilibrium is inefficient as measured by $pQ - rK$. An employer who could commit to its level of capital could increase its profits or utility. The inefficiency could be resolved in several ways.

First, depending on whether government or private firms can better com-
mit, production should be assigned to one or the other.

Second, following Holmstrom (1982) an organization (say government) could subcontract, offering to pay the producer only if output is at the level the organization views as optimal. Multiple equilibria can appear, but one of them is the Stackelberg outcome described above.

Third, an organization could offer a subcontractor a price for the output which differs from the organization’s marginal valuation of the good. If the organization (say government) pays more than $p$ per unit of output, then the employer’s reaction curve shifts up; the Nash equilibrium between the firm and the worker will have more capital. An employer paid less than $p$ could be induced to provide less capital than in the Nash equilibrium. Thus, government can induce the solution that it would choose were it the employer and behaved as a Stackelberg leader. Coupled with a lump sum payment to or from the firm which ensures zero profits, government can thus induce the outcome that it would choose were it the employer and behaved as a Stackelberg leader.

These considerations may explain why government pays firms to produce goods which are not public goods. When workers, such as medical personnel in hospitals, or university professors in research labs, care about output, indirect provision can yield better outcomes than unmediated provision.

Lastly, one way an employer may be limited in its ability to crowd out private effort is by union contracts. Workers concerned about such crowding out may favor contracts which require the firm to provide some level of services or of capital which are substitutes for worker effort. This should be especially common with devoted workers. For example, I expect that university workers who have direct contact with the people they serve will
care more about the output than do workers who only have indirect contact. Teachers, for example, may care about teaching well, and want to ensure that the university provides them with adequate resources.

To test for this implication, I looked at union contracts at the University of California. Consider the Non-Senate Instructional Unit Memorandum of Understanding. Article 8 contains the following:

The University shall provide access to facilities, services, texts, and instructional support that is reasonably necessary for NSF [Non-senate faculty] to complete their assigned duties and responsibilities including but not limited to:

a. Office and desk space, telephone, and answering equipment;
b. A computer;
c. Storage space;
d. Office, laboratory, and instructional equipment;
e. Mailbox;
f. Office Supplies;
g. Text, and or reading materials;
h. Photocopying equipment.

Article 9 states:

Campuses will establish a Professional Development Fund Pool dedicated to providing support for professional development of NSF. This Development Fund and program is separate from the program referenced in Article 8.... The Professional development

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Fund Pool will be funded annually, and each campus will allocate $135 per NSF Full Time Equivalent (FTE).

The University’s contract with the California Nurses Association includes Article 6 stating:

1. Nurses are encouraged to pursue professional development and education in relation to their career in health care.

2. Nurses shall be reimbursed for the costs of educational programs required and approved by the University. Time spent in such educational programs shall be considered time worked.

3. Nurses attending University courses or seminars shall be eligible for fee reductions applicable to other nurses at their campus/Laboratory.

4. Nothing in this Article shall prevent the University from granting additional professional development and/or educational opportunities.

Forty (40) hours paid professional development and educational leave will be provided to full-time nurses per contract year.

Nurses who are scheduled to take the examination which would grant a state and/or nationally recognized certification, and who request the examination day off in accordance with the unit’s scheduling procedures, shall be assigned paid professional development and educational leave for the day on which the examination is taken.

Compare these provisions with the AFSCME Service Unit Contract. This applies to workers, such as maintenance staff, who have less direct contact
with the beneficiaries and who may lack the professional interest in the outcome of their activities.

At its sole discretion, the University may permit employees to attend career-related or position-related development programs. In each case payment of fees, duration of released time and status of released time as time on pay status or time worked is at the discretion of the University. ....

Uniforms are attire which are required by the University to be worn in the performance of assigned duties. The University shall have the sole discretion to determine who shall wear a uniform and the conditions under which it must be worn. When a uniform is required by the University an employee shall be responsible, at the time of employment, for the purchase of uniform components specified by the University.

A similar clause requiring workers to pay for their own uniforms is found in the contract with the CUE Clerical Unit.

Notice the pattern that appears in these contracts. When a worker would want on his own to do something that would benefit the university (such as buying books), the union contract requires the university to pay some of the cost. But when the university wants a worker to do something that the worker does not particularly want (such as wearing a uniform), the worker is required to bear the cost. The pattern does not appear to reflect a simple desire for fringe benefits, but is instead consistent with the existence of some workers who wish to limit the employer’s exploitation of devoted workers.
5 Notation

\( C(x) \) A worker’s cost of unverified effort \( x \)

\( F(K, x) \) Production function

\( K \) Capital

\( p \) Valuation of unit of output by employer

\( V \) Valuation of unit of output by worker

\( x \) Unverified effort of a worker

\( \pi \) Monitored effort of worker
References


