"Nonlinear pricing of telecommunications with call and network externalities"
JEL codes: D42, L12, L96
Keywords: telecommunications, call and network externalities, nonlinear pricing
Abstract: This paper investigates how call and network externalities affect a monopolist's
optimal nonlinear tariff in a two-way telecommunication service market, where consumers' valuations for outgoing and incoming calls are positively correlated
and the firm is not allowed to charge for incoming calls. It is shown that, in contrast to the traditional efficiency-on-the-top result, all
subscribers including those with the highest willingness-to-pay make suboptimal quantities of calls in the equilibrium.
The presence of call externalities may result in the existence of no-call-making subscribers in equilibrium. Also, the firm may have incentives to
sell the service below costs to some low-valuation consumers in order to take advantage of the effect of network externalities.
Pre-publication pdf copy.