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Lin Nan

Lin Nan

Associate Professor of Management


Professor Lin Nan is the Accounting Area Coordinator at Krannert Management School, Purdue University. She has taught core MBA financial accounting courses for years and has been on the list of Outstanding and Distinguished MBA Instructors every year. She has published numerous research papers on top journals such as The Accounting Review, Journal of Accounting Research, Journal of Accounting and Economics, Management Science, Contemporary Accounting Research, Review of Accounting Studies, and Journal of Management Accounting Research. She has won research awards including Jay N. Ross Young Faculty Scholar Award at Purdue and Outstanding Management Accounting Paper Award of American Accounting Association. She currently serves on editorial boards of Journal of Management Accounting Research and Production and Operations Management.

In 2019 Accounting Research Rankings by Brigham Young University, Professor Lin Nan was ranked #2 Top Analytical Author in Financial Analytical Research in the past six years and in the past 12 years globally, and was ranked #7 Top Analytical Author in all topics for the past six years globally. She was the only female scholar among the top 10 authors. (More detailed information is available at and

Before joining Purdue in 2012, Professor Lin Nan taught at Tepper School of Business at Carnegie Mellon University. She holds a Bachelor degree in Engineering, a Master degree in Economics, and a PhD degree in Accounting.

Journal Articles

  • Carlos Corona, Lin Nan, and Gaoqing Zhang (2019). Banks' Asset Reporting Frequency and Capital Regulation: An Analysis of Discretionary Use of Fair-Value Accounting. The Accounting Review, vol. 94 (2), 157-178.
  • Mingcherng Deng, Lin Nan, and Xiaoyan Wen (2019). Information Quality and Endogenous Project Outcomes. Contemporary Accounting Research, vol. 36 (2), 732-757.
  • Lin Nan and Xiaoyan Wen (2019). Penalties, Manipulation, and Investment Efficiency. Management Science, vol. 65 (10), 4878-4900.
  • Carlos Corona, Lin Nan, and Gaoqing Zhang (2019). The Coordination Role of Stress Tests in Bank Risk Taking.. Journal of Accounting Research, vol. 57 (5), 1161-1200.
  • Jing Li, Lin Nan, and Ran Zhao. (2018). Corporate Governance Roles of Information Quality and Corporate Takeovers. Review of Accounting Studies, vol. 23 (3), 1207-1240.
  • Carlos Corona, Lin Nan, and Gaoqing Zhang (2015). Accounting Information Quality, Interbank Competition, and Bank Risk-Taking. The Accounting Review, vol. 90 (3), 967-985.
  • Lin Nan and Xiaoyan Wen (2014). Financing and Investment Efficiency, Information Quality, and Accounting Biases. Management Science, vol. 60 (9), 2308-2323.
  • Pierre Liang and Lin Nan (2014). Endogenous Precision of Performance Measures and Limited Managerial Attention. European Accounting Review, vol. 23 (4), 693-727.
  • Carlos Corona and Lin Nan (2013). Preannouncing Competitive Decisions in Oligopoly Markets. Journal of Accounting and Economics, vol. 56 (1), 73-90.
  • Guoming Lai, Laurens Debo, and Lin Nan (2011). Channel Stuffing with Short-Term Interest in Market Value. Management Science, vol. 57 (2), 332-346.
  • Lin Nan (2011). An Unintended Consequence of SFAS 133: Promoting Speculation. Journal of Management Accounting Research, vol. 23 305-329.
  • Lin Nan (2008). The Agency Problems of Hedging and Earnings Management. Contemporary Accounting Research, vol. 25 (3), 859-890.

Forthcoming Publications

  • Carlos Corona, Lin Nan, and Ran Zhao. Imitation in Product-Market Competition and Accounting Reporting. Journal of Management Accounting Research,
  • Financial Reporting

    Fouling Up: Can higher penalties encourage good companies to manipulate their financial reports?

    In September 2018, Orlando-based SeaWorld Entertainment and its former CEO agreed to pay a penalty of more than $5 million to the Securities and Exchange Commission for misleading investors about the impact of the documentary film Blackfish on the company’s reputation and business. A study by accounting professors at Purdue’s Krannert School of Management and TCU’s Neeley School of Business finds that while penalties on companies for misconduct in financial reporting help to improve investment efficiency, increasing such penalties may induce entrepreneurs with good projects to offer rosier pictures of their prospects.

    Full story: Fouling Up: Can higher penalties encourage good companies to manipulate their financial reports?

  • Downside of High Information Quality

    Professor Lin Nan discusses her research on the downside of high information quality in accounting

  •  reports in board room

    Advancing Accounting

    The Krannert School of Management presented the fourth annual Purdue Accounting Theory Conference in May with a program that included distinguished guest speakers from across the country as well as rising scholars in the field. Accounting professors Mark Bagnoli, the Olson Chair in Management, and Susan Watts, the Emanuel T. Weiler Chair in Management, served as coordinators of the conference along with Associate Professor Lin Nan.

    Full story: Advancing Accounting

  • Quality, Competition, and Risk-Taking

    Accounting Information Quality, Interbank Competition, and Bank Risk-Taking.

Phone: 60551
Office: RAWL 4031

Area(s) of Expertise

Theoretical research in accounting